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THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
THOMAS BUERGFNTHAL*
I. INTRODUCTION
T ODAY in the United States "tokenism" in the sphere of human rights is
daily exposed as the negation of human rights. But in the domain of inter-
national law, the slightest achievement in this area, however small when com-
pared to the tasks still undone, is hailed as a revolutionary step forward, and
measures which would otherwise be dismissed as mere lip-service, are often un-
critically accepted as progress. It is accordingly not surprising that the volum-
inous literature dealing with the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms' does little to point out the practical weaknesses of the
system established by it. That considerable success has been achieved in its
administration, that its very existence is a great accomplishment, is undisputed.
But apart from the fact that even the most complete implementation of its
provisions would still only guarantee a bare minimum of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, very few searching questions have been asked about the
manner in which states adhering to the Convention are discharging the obliga-
tions incumbent upon them. Such questions have to be asked, not to disparage
past achievements, but to prevent the lethargic acceptance of token implementa-
tion. While one cannot be unaware of the snail-like progress international law
has been able to make in the sphere of human rights, it should also be remem-
bered that, since the Convention is not global in application, it should in all
fairness be evaluated in the light of what can today be reasonably expected of
Western European states.
One aspect of the European Convention of Human Rights that has re-
ceived very little systematic attention concerns the extent to which the Conven-
tion has been implemented within the states adhering to it. Ideally, a paper
dealing with the domestic implementation of the Convention should examine
all areas of national substantive and procedural law to determine whether and
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1. The European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter cited as Convention] was
signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, and entered into force on September 3, 1953, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 66(2), after ten instruments of ratification had been
deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. The first Protocol to the Con-
vention on Human Rights, which guarantees three additional rights (peaceful enjoyment of
property, right to education, free elections), was signed in Paris on March 20, 1952. It became
effective on May 18, 1954. The equally authentic English and French texts of the Convention
and the Protocol may be found in European Commission of Human Rights, Documents and
Decisions [hereinafter cited as 1 Yearbook] 4 (1955-57). See generally Stein & Hay, Cases
and Materials on the Law and Institutions of the Atlantic Area 367-94 (1963).
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how they are affected by the Convention. This task, because of its scope, calls
for a joint multi-national scholarly project that has not yet been undertaken.
That it should be undertaken is clear. Without it the real impact of the Con-
vention cannot be properly evaluated. A more modest study and the one here
attempted, seeks to ascertain, on a country by country basis, whether the Con-
vention has gained the status of domestic law. Such an analysis should at least
Teveal the extent to which the High Contracting Parties honor the obligations
they assumed by ratifying the Convention. 2
II
The European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
was designed, as its preamble indicates, to bring about the collective enforce-
ment by European states of certain of the human rights proclaimed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. Section I of the Convention, consisting of 17 Articles, enumerates
and delimits the rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Conven-
tion.3 To ensure that the High Contracting Parties honor these obligations, the
Convention provides for the establishment of a European Commission of Human
Rights and a European Court of Human Rights.4
The Commission was created to review state and in some circumstances
private petitions charging a violation of the Convention. That is, a state ad-
hering to the Convention may refer to the Commission an alleged breach
thereof by another High Contracting Party.5 Aggrieved individuals have that
right, however, only if the allegedly delinquent state has also, in addition to
ratifying the Convention, expressly recognized the competence of the Commis-
sion to pass on private petitions.6 The Commission's function consists of in-
vestigating the charges and, if possible, securing a friendly settlement "on the
basis of respect for Human Rights as defined in this Convention." 7 If it fails to
bring about such a settlement, it must submit a report to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe,8 containing the facts of the case, the Com-
mission's opinion concerning the merits of the allegations together with any
recommendations it desires to make.9 Whenever such a case is not referred to
2. The following states have ratified "the Convention: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom.
3. For an analysis of these provisions, see Weil, The European Convention on Human
Rights 43-80 (1963).
4. Convention, Art. 19. For a discussion dealing with these two institutions and
their respective functions, see Well, op. cit. supra note 3, at 81-165; Robertson, The
European Court of Human Rights, 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1960); Golsong, Das Rechtsschutz-
system der Europdiischen Menschenrechtskonvention (1958).
5. Convention, Art. 24.
6. Convention, Art. 25(1).
7. Convention, Art. 28.
8. The Committee of Ministers consists of one government representative of each
Member State of the Council of Europe. See generally, Robertson, The Council of Europe
24-40 (2d ed. 1961).
9. Convention, Art. 31.
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the Human Rights Court, in the manner indicated below, within three months
from the date of the Commission's transmission of its report to the Council of
Ministers, it is the latter that must decide, whether there has been a violation
of the Convention and what action should be taken.10
The European Court of Human Rights, whose jurisdiction extends to all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention," may
only hear a case, if it has been submitted to it within the three-month period
referred to above, if the Commission has failed to bring about a friendly
settlement, and if the allegedly delinquent state has recognized the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.' 2 A state's ratification of the Convention does not
constitute ipso facto a recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court;
a separate declaration must be made to that effect.' 3 A private party, however,
has no standing to appeal to the Court. Only the Commission and the High
Contracting Parties may do so. 14 The Court's judgment is final1r and its deci-
sions are binding upon the parties to the case."0 While the Court lacks the
power to reverse or set aside domestic judgments or to annul national legisla-
tion in conflict with the Convention, it may "afford just satisfaction to the in-
jured party."'17
III
Needless to say, the international machinery established by the Conven-
tion to ensure the enforcement of the rights proclaimed therein is far from
perfect. To demonstrate its defects, one need only note that the victim of an
illegal state action has no standing to initiate a suit in the Court. He cannot,
furthermore, control the proceedings before the Commission, even if the deli-
quent state has recognized the Commission's competence to accept private ap-
peals. Besides, a number of states which have ratified the Convention have as
yet recognized neither the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court nor the right of
private petition.' 8 But even if all of them did so today, the expense, effort and
10. For the powers and function of the Committee of Ministers, see Convention,
Art. 32. See also Cassese, L'escercizio di funzioni guirisdizionali da parte del Cornitato dei
ininistri del Consiglio d'Europa, 45 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 398 (1962).
11. Convention, Art. 45.
12. Convention, Arts. 45, 46, 47.
13. Convention, Art. 46.
14. Convention, Art. 48 provides that in addition to the Commission a case may be
submitted to the Court by a High Contracting Party whose national is alleged to be a
victim; a High Contracting Party which referred the case to the Commission; or a High
Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged.
15. Convention, Art. 52.
16. Convention, Art. 53.
17. Convention, Art. 50. For an analysis of this provision, see Vis, La r~paration des
violations de la Convention Europienne des Droits de l'Hommes, 10 Annales de la Facult6
de Droit et des Sciences Politiques et Economiques de Strasbourg [hereinafter cited as
Annales] 279 (1961).
18. Of the 15 states that have ratified the Convention, only the following ten have
recognized the right of private petition: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Eight of
these have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court, that is,
Norway and Sweden have as yet not done so. Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Turkey and the United
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delay involved in vindicating one's rights by submitting a complaint to an inter-
national institution like the Commission would be substantial, if only because
all domestic remedies must first be exhausted.19 Accordingly, if the High
Contracting Parties had agreed only to be internationally accountable for a
breach of the Convention, it might have been expected that its impact on the
day-to-day administration of justice would be minimal. Needless to say, if re-
lief cannot be had where and when it is needed, it loses much of its prophylactic
value. Therefore, the real significance of the Convention derives from the fact
that by adhering to it, the High Contracting Parties assumed two interrelated
obligations. They undertook to implement the Convention within their respec-
tive jurisdictions by making it a part of their domestic law,20 and they pledged
that an aggrieved individual "shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority" to enforce the rights guaranteed in the Convention. 21
Since it is the purpose of this study to determine whether the High Con-
tracting Parties have in fact discharged these obligations, it should be noted that
the domestic implementation of the Convention is facilitated by the fact that
most of its operative provisions 22 were designed to be self-executing in nature.
That is to say, they were formulated so as to be capable of creating rights
and duties directly enforceable in national courts without necessitating special
implementing legislation 3 As a result, in those countries whose constitutional
law provides that the ratification of a self-executing treaty effects its automatic
transformation into the internal legal order, the operative provisions of the
Convention should ipso facto gain the status of directly enforceable domestic
law.24 And in those states, where a self-executing treaty, even if ratified,
Kingdom have recognized neither the competence of the Commission to receive private
appeals nor the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
19. See Convention, Art. 26.
20. Compare Convention, Art. 64, with Arts. 1, 13. See also European Commission of
Human Rights, Application No. 214/56, Decision of June 9, 1958, 2 Yearbook 214, 234
(1958-59); Golsong, Die europtlische Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und
Grundfreiheiten, 10 Jahrbuch des 5ffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 123, 128-29 (1961).
21. Convention, Art 13.
22. As used here, "operative provisions" of the Convention refers to the provisions
enumerated in section I of the Convention.
23. That the Convention was drafted to achieve this result is apparent from the
legislative history, or travaux prdparatoires, of the Convention, see Golsong, Das Rechts-
schutzsystem der Europ ischen Menschenrechtskonvention 9 (1958), the precise and
mandatory formulation of most of its operative provisions, and from the fact that they
demonstrate a clear intent to grant directly enforceable rights to individuals. For an ex-
tensive analysis of this question, see Siisterhenn, L'application de la Convention sur le plan
d# Droit Interne, 10 Annales 303, 304-07 (1961).
But see Comte, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in Munic-
ipal Law, 4 J. Int'l Comm'n jurists 94 (1962), who argues that, while such provisions as
Articles 3, 7, 11, 12 and 14 are capable of immediate application in any of the states
adhering to the Convention, this is not necessarily true with regard to certain of the other
provisions, because they may in some countries require far-reaching institutional changes
beyond the province of the courts. Id. at 118. Although this may well be true, it cannot
affect the contention that the Convention was intended to create rights enforceable in the
domestic courts. Instead, it may well bolster the contention advanced in this paper that
adherence to the Convention constitutes an undertaking that no such obstacles to the com-
plete enforcement of the Convention exist within the jurisdiction of the High Contracting
Parties.
24. See Weil, op. cit. supra note 3, at 44.
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cannot be invoked in the courts until the requisite legislation has been en-
acted, no special legislation beyond such enactment should be necessary to
achieve the full implementation of the Convention.2 5 But since it is for the
appropriate national authorities to decide whether and to what extent the
provisions of a treaty create legal rights enforceable in their own courts, we
must look to the law of the fourteen states-6 adhering to the Convention to
ascertain its domestic status.27
AUSTRIA
To ascertain the domestic status of the Convention in Austria28 two
questions must be resolved. First, did the Convention, by virtue of the requi-
site parliamentary ratification, become a so-called constitutional law (Ver-
Jassungsgesetz), in which case it would take precedence over both prior and
later ordinary laws?2 Second, if it cannot be characterized as a constitutional
law, what legal relationship exists between the Convention and ordinary
Austrian laws?3
0
Although the contrary has generally been assumed,3 1 the Austrian Consti-
tutional Court recently ruled that the Convention does not have the status of
a constitutional law.32  This decision was based upon an interpretation of
Articles 50 and 44 of the Austrian constitution. Article 50 of the Austrian
Constitution 3 provides:
(1) All political treaties, and other treaties in so far as they
25. See Siisterhenn, supra note 23, at 307.
26. While 15 states have ratified the Convention, see supra note 2, no consideration
will here be given to the domestic status of the Convention in Cyprus, since Cyprus did not
ratify the Convention until October 6, 1962.
27. Despite basic similarities in the constitutional law of some of these states, great
differences exist in the manner in which their courts have approached the Convention. Only
the four Scandinavian countries can readily be treated as a group. Accordingly, except for
these states, the domestic status of the Convention will here be examined on a country-by-
country basis.
28. The relationship of the Convention to Austrian law has been the subject of con-
siderable scholarly debate. See, e.g., Ermacora, Die Menchenrechtskonvention als Bestandteil
der isterreichischen Rechtsordnung, 81 Juristische Blgtter [hereinafter cited as J.B.] 396
(1959) ; Winler, Der Verfassungsrang von Staatsvertriigen. Eine Untersuchung des geltenden
dsterreichischen Verfassungsrechtes, 10 Osterreichische Zeitschrift fir iiffentliches Recht 514
(1959/60); Moser, Die Europische Menschenrechtskonvention und die Bestimnnungen der
StPO. jiber die Verwahrungs-und Untersuchungshaft, 14 5sterreichische Juristen-Zeitung 11
(1959) ; Janowsky, Auswirkungen der Europiiischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschen-
rechte und Grundfreiheiten auf das 5sterreichische Recht, 81 J.B. 145 (1959).
29. See Federal Constitution of Austria, Arts. 89 (2), 140; Adamovich & Spanner,
Handbuch des (5sterreichischen Verfassungsrechts 398 (5th ed. 1957); Seidl-Hohenveldern,
Transformation or Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law, 12 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 88, 111-12 (1963).
30. On the relation between treaties and domestic laws in Austria, see Seidl-Hohen-
veldern, Relation of International Law to Internal Law in Austria, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 451
(1955).
31. See, e.g., Waldock, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, 34 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 356, 358 (1959).
32. Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of October 14, 1961, 84 J.B. 145 (1962),
4 Yearbook 604 (1961).
33. All translations of the Austrian Constitution are taken from 1 Peaslee, Constitutions
of Nations 107 (2d ed. 1956).
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contain provisions modifying existing laws, require for their validity
the approval of the Nationalrat.
(2) The provisions of article 42, paragraphs (1) to (4), and,
if a constitutional law be modified by a treaty, those of article 44,
paragraph (1), are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to resolutions of the
Nationalrat regarding the approval of treaties.
And Article 44(1) stipulates that:
Constitutional laws or constitutional provisions contained in ordinary
laws may be enacted by the Nationalrat only in the presence of at
least one-half of its members and by a majority of two-thirds of the
votes cast. They shall be specifically designated as such ("constitu-
tional law", "constitutional provision").
In ratifying the Convention, parliament complied with the relevant provisions
of Article 42 and Article 44 (1), on the assumption that the Convention, thus
approved, would acquire constitutional status.34 It failed, however, to designate
the Convention as a "constitutional law" or "constitutional provision." This
formal omission, the Constitutional Cout ruled, deprived the Convention of
constitutional status regardless of its contents and of any possible contrary
parliamentary intention.
35
This decision and its underlying reasoning has been severly criticized
by a number of leading Austrian constitutional lawyers.36 They argue that,
when Article 50 (2) of the Austrian Constitution provides that Article 44
(1) is applicable by analogy, this stipulation refers to the voting requirement
and not to the designation of a treaty as a "constitutional law." In support of
this theory they advance a number of arguments. One contention is that
parliament, in ratifying a treaty, discharges a function different from the one
it performs in enacting laws, since it has no power to affect the contents of
the treaty. If it were to designate a treaty or certain of its provisions as
"constitutional laws" or "constitutional provisions," parliament would actually
be modifying the treaty. This contention is buttressed by two related consider-
ations: (1) that no treaty ratified by Austria contains such a designation, al-
34. In submitting the Convention for ratification to the National Council, the president
of that body stated in taking the vote:
Since the requested ratification of the Convention and the Protocol thereto consti-
tutes a binding obligation by the federal constitutional lawgiver [Bundes-Ver-
fassungsgesetzgeber] and accordingly must be regarded as state treaties modifying
the Constitution [verfassungsiindernde Staatsvertrdige] within the meaning of Article
50 of the Federal Constitution, I herewith note, in accordance with Article 55(c)
of the rules of procedure, the presence of one half of the members.
Stenographische Protokolle iiber die Sitzung des Nationalrates, VII, GP., 1958, p. 2951,
quoted in Winkler, supra note 28, at 522. (Author's translation from Winkler's text.)
35. Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of October 14, 1961, 84 J.B. 145, 146
(1962), 4 Yearbook 604, 613-16 (1961). This conclusion was reiterated by the Austrian
Administrative Court, Judgment of December 15, 1961, 84 J.B. 644 (1962).
36. See, e.g., Ermacora, Die Menschenrechte vnd der Formalismus, 84 J.B. 118 (1962);
Pfeifer, Die parlamentarische Genehmigung von Staatsvertriigen in bsterreich. Ihre inner-
staatliche Wirksamkeit, 12 0sterreichische Zeitschrift fUr iMffentliches Recht 1 (1962);
Pfeifer, Der Verfassungsrang von "Staatsrvertrigen, 17 0sterreichische Juristen-Zeitung 29(1962). But see Winkler, supra note 28, whose arguments the Constitutional Court adopted.
359
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though some of them or certain of their provisions had always been regarded
as having constitutional status; and (2) that in ratifying the Human Rights
Convention, parliament proceeded on the assumption that the Convention was
a constitutional law and thought that it had complied with all provisions
necessary to give it that status.3 7 In addition, it is contended, that the deter-
mination whether or not a treaty does have the status of a constitutional law
must be made by reference to its contents. That is, it has to be asked whether
it deals with matters traditionally regulated by the constitution or by ordinary
laws. Since the Convention deals with fundamental human rights and since
in Austria such rights have been traditionally categorized as constitutional
norms, the same should be true, so the argument runs, with regard to the
relevant provisions of the Convention.38
It is noteworthy that in reaching its conclusion that the Convention did
not acquire constitutional status in Austria, the Constitutional Court con-
sidered and rejected the arguments outlined above. As a result, it is necessary
to determine what legal status, if any, the Convention does have in Austria.
This question has been passed upon by the Constitutional Court in the deci-
sion already discussed 9 and in some other cases 40 It was also considered by
other Austrian courts. 41 What emerges from an examination of these decisions
is the uniformly expressed view that, generally speaking, the Convention has
become ordinary federal law.42 But, as these cases indicate, this general con-
clusion does not resolve a more basic question: what protection does a person
have in Austria, when rights guaranteed in the Convention are violated by the
application of a prior Austrian law in conflict with a provision of the Con-
vention? Clearly, since the Convention does not have the status of a constitu-
tional norm, it can always be superseded by a later federal law. By the same
token, one might assume that it would prevail over a prior law in conflict
with its provisions.4 3 But, since under Austrian constitutional law the rule
lex posterior derogat legit priori applies only to self-executing treaties, 44 our
second conclusion is valid only with regard to those provisions of the Con-
37. See note 34 supra.
38. See authorities cited in note 36 supra.
39. Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of October 14, 1961, supra note 35.
40. Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of June 27, 1960, [1960) Sammlung der
Erkenntnisse des Verfassungsgerichtshofes [hereinafter cited as Slg. VerfG.] 330, 3 Yearbook
616 (1960) ; Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of October 13, 1960, [1960] Slg. VerfG.
460.
41. See, e.g., Austria, Administrative Court, Judgment of December 15, 1961, 84 J.B.
644 (1962); Austria, Administrative Court, Judgment of December 11, 1958, Sammlung der
Erkenntnisse des Verwaltungsgerichtshofes 990.
42. See Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of June 27, 1960, [1960] Slg. VerfG.
330, 3 Yearbook 616 (1960); Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of October 14, 1961,
84 J.B. 145 (1962), 4 Yearbook 604 (1961); Austria, Administrative Court, Judgment of
December 15, 1961, 84 J.B. 644 (1962); see also Pfeifer, Der Verlassungsrang von Staats-
vertriigen, 17 Osterreichische Juristen-Zeitung 29 (1962).
43. See Adamovich & Spanner, op. cit. supra note 29, at 317-18, 331-32. Pfeifer, Die
parlalnentarische Genehmigung von Staatsvertriigen in Osterreich. Ihre innerstaatliche Wirk-
sarnkeit, 12 bsterreichische Zeitschrift fiir Uffentliches Recht 1, 47 (1962).
44. See Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 29, at 111, 115 (1963).
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vention which the Austrian courts determine to be self-executing in nature.
The Constitutional Court considered this question recently in a case in which
petitioner maintained that her arrest and detention under a penal provision
of the revenue laws 45 violated Article 5 (1) (c) 46 of the Convention. Although it
acknowledged that the Convention was later in date and that the revenue law
here in question might be incompatible with Article 5, the Court nevertheless
rejected petitioner's claim, reasoning as follows:
Paragraph 1(c) of Article 5 is, however, non-self-executing and
the provision it contains requires to be read in the light of para-
graph 3 of the same Article. That paragraph leaves open several
questions: the official before whom an arrested person is to be
brought . . .; what is to be regarded as a reasonable period within
which to bring such person to trial; the conditions under which an
arrested person may be allowed out on bail or other safeguard; and
the nature of such safeguard or amount of such bail. These ex-
amples alone are enough to show that the self-execution of such
provisions is impossible. It will not become possible to apply Article
5(3), and hence also Article 5(1) (c), unless and until further steps
are taken to define explicitly the body before which an arrested
person is to be brought and the period within which judgement is to
45. The provision in question is f[ 85 of the Bundesgesetz von 26. Juni 1958, betreffend
das Finanzstrafrecht und das Finanzstrafverfahernsrecht, published in [1958] Bundesgesetz-
blatt fir die Republik Osterreich 1237, which permits the arrest and detention by the
revenue authorities of persons suspected of having violated the revenue laws.
46. Convention, Art. 5 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accord-
ance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the
lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation pre-
scribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of
having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to pre-
vent his committing an offence or fleeing after. having done so;(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or va-
grants;(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unau-
thorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken
with a view to deportation or extradition.
(2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which
he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within
a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear for trial.
(4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
(5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention
of the provisions of this Articie shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
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be pronounced, besides dealing in greater detail with the question
of bail or other safeguard. Other measures may also be required for
the application of the provisions in question. The provisions they
contain need to be interpreted by the legislation. [sic] and cannot
be self-executing.
A provision that is not self-executing, and one that is, are not
mutually exclusive and, for that reason, a non-self-executing pro-
vision cannot modify a self-executing one. Hence, paragraph 85 [of
the revenue law] remains valid notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 5 (1) (c).47
The same tribunal, in an earlier decision, held equally categorically that
Article 648 of the Convention is non-self-executing and therefore not directly
enforceable in Austria.49 These conclusions were echoed by the Austrian
Administrative Court which, after finding that implementing legislation was
necessary before Article 5 of the Convention could be enforced in Austria,
specifically advised the appellant that his sole remedy was by way of a private
petition to the European Commission of Human Rights.r °
Thus, even without necessarily agreeing with some legal scholars, who
have concluded that the Austrian courts would hold the remaining provisions
of the Convention to be non-self-executing, 51 one thing is abundantly clear.
47. Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of October 14, 1961, 84 J.B. 145 (1962),
4 Yearbook 604, 610-12 (1961). The validity of the Court's conclusion has been seriously
questioned. See Pfeifer, supra note 43, at 51 n.176a; Ermacora, supra note 36.
48. Convention, Art. 6 provides:
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national
security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice.
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail,
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing
or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when
the interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions
as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court.
49. Austria, Constitutional Court, Judgment of June 27, 1960, [1960) Sig. VerfG. 330,
3 Yearbook 616 (1960). This judgment has been criticized by Vasak, Was bedeutet die
Aussage, ein Staatsvertrag sd "self-executing"?, 83 J.B. 621 (1961).
50. Austria, Administrative Court, Judgment of December 15, 1961, 84 J.B. 644, 645
(1962) (note Janowsky).
51. See Ermacora, supra note 36; Vasak, supra note 49. See also Austria, Appeals Court
(Oberlandesgericht/Linz), Judgment of January 22, 1960, 2 Zeitschrift fUr Rechtsvergleichung
170 (1961), where a Belgian defendant's contention that under the Convention he was entitled
362
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That is, that in many, if not all, areas where the Convention might guarantee
a person greater rights than are assured him under the Austrian constitution
and laws, he will not be successful in invoking the protection of the Conven-
tion in Austrian courts until the requisite implementing legislation has been
promulgated.52 In this connection it is significant that in 1959 the Austrian
government submitted to parliament a bill entitled "Federal Constitutional
Law ... for promulgating the provisions necessary to enable Austria to fulfill
the undertakings arising from ratification of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of the Protocol
thereto."5 3 While no action has as yet been taken on this bill and while it
deals with only some provisions of the Convention, it is significant that, as the
title of the proposed act indicates, it would, if passed, have the status of a
constitutional law and therefore take precedence over ordinary legislation, both
prior and subsequent. 53 1
BELGIUM
Under Belgian law a self-executing treaty approved by the legislature in
conformity with Article 68 of the Constitution54 has force of law. That is to
say, it has the same effect as any other legislative enactment.5 5 And like
domestic legislation, its contents are not subject to judicial review.5 6 Self-
to a French translation of the Austrian indictment was rejected. But see Ger. Fed. Rep.,
District Court (Amtsgericht/Bremerhaven), Judgment of October 18, 1962, 16 Neue Juris-
tische Wocbenschrift 827 (1963), ruling that American defendant was entitled under Article 6
of the Convention to the free services of an interpreter.
52. For a comparison of the rights guaranteed by the Convention with those protected
under Austrian law, see the report of Prof. Pfeifer's lecture, Die rechtliche Bedeutung der
Europischen Konvention zunt Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten ffr
Osterreich, 80 J.B. 599 (1958).
53. Bill of September 23, 1959. An English translation of its text and accompanying
explanatory message has been reproduced in 2 Yearbook 528 (1958-59). For a discussion
of this bill see Golsong, Die europiiische Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und
Grundfreiheiten, 10 Jahrbuch des Uffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 123, 132-33 (1961).
53a. Since the completion of this article, the following has come to the attention of the
writer. As a result of a series of private appeals lodged with the European Commission of
Human Rights against Austria, the Austrian legislature enacted an amendment to the Austrian
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to this amendment an accused has the right to be
heard by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, on a review of his "plea of nullity"
(Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde). [1962] Bundesgesetzbatt fUr die Republik Osterreich, No. 229.
Prior to this amendment only the Public Prosecutor was given an oral hearing while the
accused and his counsel were excluded therefrom, having the right merely to present written
observations. A later law makes it possible for persons convicted before the 1962 amendment
entered into force to apply for a re-hearing of their appeals within six months, provided their
petitions have been ruled admissible by the European Commission of Human Rights. See
[1963] Bundesgesetzblatt flir die Republik (5sterreich, No. 66; Council of Europe News,
November 1963, pp. 1-2 (New ser. No. 29).
54. Article 68(2) of the Belgium Constitution provides: "Treaties of commerce, and
treaties which may burden the state, or bind Belgians individually, shall take effect only
after having received the approval of the two houses." 1 Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations
153 (2d ed. 1956).
55. Janssen-Pevtschin, Velu & Vanwelkenhuyzen, La convention de sauvegarde des
Droits de lhomine et des liberts fondamentales et le fonctionnement des juridictions belges,
15 Chronique de Politique Etrang6re 199, 217 (1962); Masquelin, Le contrble et l'application
des trait~s par les organes jurisdictionnels internes, 15 Annales de Droit et de Sciences
Politiques 3, 4 (1955).
56. De Visscher, La Comnunautg Europ~enne du Charbon et de l'Acier et les Etats
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executing international agreements, which have become domestic law by virtue
of parliamentary approval and publication in the official journal, supersede
prior legislative enactments. 57 By the same token, later laws bar the applica-
tion of prior inconsistent treaty provisions.58 Belgian courts reach this con-
clusion by postulating that it is for the legislature to determine whether a law
violates international obligations assumed by Belgium, and that the courts
have no power to refuse the application of a later law, even though it may
conflict with a treaty.59
While Belgian courts have not expressly passed upon the hierarchic
status of the Convention, it is safe to assume that the operative provisions
of the Convention have become directly applicable Belgian law." As such, they
would prevail over conflicting prior domestic legislation. This conclusion finds
support in the manner in which Belgian tribunals have ruled upon pleas in-
voking the Convention.61 That is to say, these courts have in the past assumed
that the provisions contained in Section I of the Convention created directly
enforceable rights under Belgian law.62 Thus, a Belgian administrative tribunal,
relying on Article 9 of the Convention, ruled that, for the purpose of deter-
mining eligibility for unemployment compensation, a practicing orthodox Jew
had the right to have Saturdays considered a day of rest, even though the
applicable statute made no such provision.6 3 And in 1963 the Belgian Supreme
snembres, in 2 Actes Offidels du Congr s International d'Etudes sur ]a C.E.C.A. 7, 50 (1957) ;
Verbaet, Du conflict entre le traitd et la loi, 9 Journal des Tribunaux d'Outre-Mer 113
(1958). The courts do have the power, however, to determine whether the treaty was
approved and published in the manner stipulated by the constitution. Masquelin, supra note
55, at 10-11.
57. Masters, International Law in National Courts: A Study of the Enforcement of
International Law in German, Swiss, French and Belgian Courts 208-09 (1932) and cases
cited there.
58. Masquelin, supra note 55, at 16; Rolin, La force obligatoire des traitis dans lajurisprudence beige, 68 Journal des Tribunaux 561 (1953); Slusny & Waelbroek, Note, 75
Journal des Tribunaux 724, 725-26 (1960).
59. Belgium, Schieble v. Procureur g~n6ral, Court of Cassation, Judgment of November
26, 1925, [1926] Pasicrisie Belge I, 76, reprinted in [1925-26] Ann. Dig. 8; Belgium, Min.
PubI. Bara et cons v. Debeur, Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, Judgment of July 3, 1953, 68
Journal des Tribunaux 518 (1953). But see Belgium, Tribunal de Commerce (Brussels),
Judgment of June 16, 1960, 75 Journal des Tribunaux 724 (1960) with highly critical note
by Slusny & Waelbroek.
60. See Rolin, Un texte de droit positif ignor6 des juristes belges: La Convention
europ~enne des Droits de L'Homme, 73 Journal des Tribunaux 515 (1958).
61. See generally Janssen-Pevtschin, Valu & Valwelkenhuyzen, supra note 55, at 217-19
and cases discussed therein.
62. See, e.g., Belgium, Min. PubI. v. Knapen, Court of Cassation, Judgment of March
25, 1963, 78 Journal des Tribunaux 333 (1963); Belgium, Min. Publ. v. Belaid, Court of
Cassation, Judgment of July 20, 1962, [1962] Pasicrisie Beige 1238; Belgium, Min. Pub].
v. Ratzloff, Court of Cassation, Judgment of September 21, 1959, 75 Journal des Tribunaux
573 (1960).
63. Belgium, Cymerman v. Office national de l'emploi, Commission rclamation O.N.E.
(Brussels), Judgment of March 13, 1962, 77 Journal des Tribunaux 267, 268 (1962).
Article 9 of the Convention provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
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Court held that Article 6(3) (b) of the Convention64 had not been violated
by a refusal to furnish a person held in preventive detention with the dossier
of the investigating magistrate. In the court's view, this provision of the Con-
vention referred to the rights of an accused at the trial and not during the
investigatory stage.6 5 That same court, in another case, rejected an appeal
based on Article 6(3) (d), wherein petitioner charged that the lower court
violated the Convention by refusing to permit him to call a certain witness in
his defense. It ruled that Article 6(3) (d) did not deprive a judge of his
largely discretionary power to determine whether the testimony of a witness
has probative value.6 6 Significantly, a comparison of this holding with the
case law of the European Commission reveals substantial agreement. Thus,
the Commission held not long ago that Article 6(3) (d), in stipulating that
everyone charged with a criminal offence is entitled "to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him," cannot be construed so as to permit "an accused per-
son to obtain the attendance of any and every person and in particular of one
who is not in a position by his evidence to assist in establishing the truth. ' 67
But even if these Belgian decisions were erroneous in their interpretation of
Article 6, they nevertheless demonstrate that the Belgian Supreme Court, un-
like its Austrian counterpart, acknowledged, that this provision of the Con-
vention was and is capable of invalidating the enforcement of a prior Belgian
law in conflict with it. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that
Belgian courts would reach that same conclusion in passing upon most of the
operative provisions of the Convention, because they are, on the whole, framed
with greater precision than Article 6.
A study of the domestic implementation of the Convention in Belgium
would be incomplete without a discussion of the consequences resulting from
the submission of the De Becker case to the Human Rights Court.68 Raymond
De Becker, a Belgian journalist and writer, was condemned to death for col-
laborating with the Germans during the Second World War. While the death
penalty was subsequently commuted, his sentence carried with it the forfeiture
of various civil rights enumerated in Article 123(6) of the Belgian Penal
Code. Subsection (e) of this law provided for the forfeiture of "the right to
have a proprietary interest in or to take part in any capacity whatsoever in
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
64. The text of Article 6 of the Convention is reproduced, supra note 48.
65. Belgium, Min. Publ. v. Knapen, supra note 62, at 334.
66. Belgium, Min. Publ. v. Belaid, supra note 62, at 1239.
67. Application No. 753/60, Decision of August 5, 1960, 3 Yearbook 310, 320 (1960).
To the same effect, see Application No. 1134/61, Decision of December 19, 1961, 4 Yearbook
378 (1961).
68. "De Becker" Case, judgment of March 27, 1962. This case was published by the
Registry of the Court as a separate pamphlet entitled "Publications of the European Court
of Human Rights, Series A: Judgments and Decisions 1962," and will be published in
Volume 5 of the Yearbook.
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the administration, editing, printing or distribution of a newspaper or any
other publication." In 1956, after his release from prison on condition that
he leave the country, De Becker appealed to the Commission charging that
the continued deprivation of the rights described in Article 123(6) and
especially subsection (e) violated Article 10 of the Convention, 0 since the
effect of this Belgian law was to prevent him for all practical purposes from
exercising his profession and expressing his opinions. The Commission accepted
the appeal70 and referred it to the Human Rights Court on April 29, 1960.
For more than a decade attempts had been made in Belgium to modify
this post-war legislation and to normalize the status of persons affected by it.
For obvious political reasons, however, only minor revisions could be enacted.
But, while the De Becker case was pending before the Human Rights Court,
the Belgian parliament hurriedly passed a far-reaching amendment provid-
ing for the mitigation of punishments meted out to Belgian collaborators.
This law prompted De Becker to withdraw the complaint he had addressed
to the Commission. Since the Commission agreeed with the Belgian government
that under these circumstances it would serve no useful purpose to pursue
the matter any further, the Human Rights Court consented to the discon-
tinuance of the proceedings. 71
GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)
In Germany the Convention has been invoked before domestic tribunals to
a much greater extent than in any other signatory state.72 And its effect on
German law in general73 and on specific legal provisions,74 has been extensively
69. Article 10 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and im-
partiality of the judiciary.
70. Application No. 214/56, Decision of June 9, 1958, 2 Yearbook 214 (1958-59).
71. "De Becker" Case, supra note 68. The applicable Belgian laws referred to in the
text are set out in the Court's judgment.
72. For a discussion of these cases see Morvay, Rechtsprechung nationaler Gerichte
zur Evuropiischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreilheiten vom 4.
November 1950 nebst Zusatzprotokoll yorm 20. Mdrz 1952, 21 Zeitschrift fiur auslaindisches
iffentliches Recht und Vblkerrecht 89 and 316 (1961). A comprehensive list of these cases
may be found in Golsong, Die europiische Konvention sum Schutze der Menschenrechte
und Grundfreiheiten, 10 Jahrbuch des *ffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 123, 131 n.41
(1961).
73. See, e.g., Echterh lter, Die Europiische Menschenrechtskonvention im Rahmen der
verfassungsmidssigen Ordnung, 10 Juristenzeitung 689 (1955); Herzog, Das Verhlitnis der
Europiischen Menschenrechtskonvention zu spliteren deutschen Gesetzen, 12 Die Mffentliche
Verwaltung 44 (1959).
74. See, e.g., Henrichs, Anderung der ZPO durch die Konvention vot Ron?, 9
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debated. 75 But the status of the Convention as directly applicable federal law
was never seriously disputed. 76 Most of the discussion revolved around the more
difficult problem of ascertaining its normative rank within the German legal
order.77 That is to say, its transformation into federal law78 did not resolve the
question whether it could be equated to a constitutional law and, if not, whether
it might nevertheless prevail over later ordinary federal laws incompatible with
its provisions.
That the Convention acquired constitutional status was suggested by one
eminent German jurist who maintained that the Convention defines and ampli-
fies the concept of human rights articulated in the German Constitution in
very general terms, and thus became an inherent part of it. 79 The courts,
however, have shown no inclination to accept this argument and have either
implicitly or expressly denied the Convention any constitutional status.80
Whether the Convention nevertheless outranks at least ordinary laws re-
gardless of the date of their promulgation is a somewhat more difficult question.
This is due to the fact that Article 25 of the Basic Law (Constitution) of the
Federal Republic provides: "The general rules of international law shall form
part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and create
rights and duties directly for the inhabitants of the federal territory." 81
Thus, if the Convention could be said to merely codify general rules of inter-
national law, its provisions would outrank ordinary federal laws and all state
legislation with the possible exception of the Federal Constitution itself.82
Monatsschrift fur deutsches Recht 140 (1955) ; von Weber, Die Durchsetzung der Grundrechte
der europdisclen Menschenrechtskonvention in der innerdeutschen Strafrechtspflege, 9
Monatsschrift fiir deutsches Recht 386 (1955).
75. For an interesting debate concerning the admissibility of a so-called constitutional
appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) pursuant to Article 90 of the Law on the Federal Consti-
tutional Court of March 12, 1951, see Guradze, Kann die Verjassungsbeschwerde auf eine
Verletzung der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte gestiitzt werden?, 13 Die
5ffentliche Verwaltung 286 (1960) (arguing in the affirmative); Herzog, Nochmals:
Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen Verletzung der Menschenrechtskonvention?, 13 Die 5ffentiche
Verwaltung 775 (1960) (arguing in the negative). The Federal Constitutional Court in its
decision of January 14, 1960, 10 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 271, 274(1960), 3 Yearbook 628, 632 (1960), held that such an appeal could not be based on the
Convention.
76. See, e.g., Ger. Fed. Rep., Appeals Court (Oberlandesgericht/Bremen), judgment
of February 17, 1960, 13 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter cited as N.J.W.] 1265
(1960), 3 Yearbook 634 (1960). But see Henrichs, supra note 74.
77. See generally Miinch, Zur Anwendung der Menschenrechtskonvention in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 17 Juristenzeitung 153 (1961).
78. On the domestic implementation of treaties under German law, see Menzel, Die
Geltung internationaler Vertrdige int innerstaatlichen Recht, in Deutsche Landesreferate zum
VI. Internalionalen Kongress ffir Rechtsvergleichung 401 (1962).
79. Echterh6lter, supra note 73, at 691-92.
80. See, e.g., Ger. Fed. Rep., Higher Administrative Court (Milnster), judgment of
November 25, 1955, 9 N.J.W. 1374 (1956), 2 Yearbook 572 (1958-59); Ger. Fed. Rep.,
Bavarian Constitutional Court, Judgment of July 3, 1961, 14 N.J.W. 1619 (1961).
81. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, English translation from 2
Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations 30 (2d ed. 1956). The German text reads as follows: "Die
allgemeinen Regein des V61kerrechts sind Bestandteil des Bundesrechtes. Sie gehen den
Gesetzen vor und erzeugen Rechte und Pffichten unmittelbar fiir die Bewohner des
Bundesgebietes."
82. See Ger. Fed. Rep., Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of March 26, 1957,
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While it might be argued that at least some provisions of the Convention
qualify as "general rules of international law," 83 this proposition has been
rejected by most commentators. 84 Their position is supported by at least one
German court,85 which reached the following conclusion:
The general rules of international law [within the meaning of Arti-
cle 25 of the Basic Law] comprise only those rules which are uni-
versally valid for all members of the community of nations and
whose reciprocal provisions are binding on them. . . . In the first
place Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Finland
and countries beyond the "Iron Curtain," not to mention all non-
European countries, have not acceded to the Convention. Even though
the municipal law of some of these countries is compatible with
the provisions of the Convention, as is partly the case in Switzer-
land, those countries have shown no wish to be bound in this matter
by an international Convention or to submit to a supranational
authority. Furthermore, . . .the Convention cannot be regarded as
a codification of general rules of international law, since the basic
rights set forth therein are not recognised in most parts of the world,
as is proved by the failure of the attempts of the United Nations
to conclude a similar Convention.86
Needless to say, the court's reasoning is not entirely persuasive. Its method of
ascertaining the meaning of "general rules of international law" is questionable,
since it seems to confuse the general acceptance of certain legal rules with the
political decision whether to adhere to international agreements codifying such
rules. Furthermore, some provisions of the Convention may well be recognized
"in most parts of the world" so as to satisfy the court's own test of a general rule
of international law.
Be that as it may, it is important to recall that German courts have
uniformly held that the operative provisions of the Convention are directly
applicable federal law.87 As such, they supersede conflicting prior federal laws
6 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 309, 363 (1956-57). See also Minch, supra
note 77, at 154, who contends that the hierarchic status of general rules of international law
within the meaning of Article 25 of the Basic Law is by no means settled in Germany, since
it is not clear in what relation they stand to the Constitution itself.
83. This argument has been advanced by von Stackelberg in his case note, 13 N.J.W.
1265 (1960), with regard to Article 5 (3) of the Convention and by Manch, supra note 77,
at 154, with regard to the rights of aliens.
84. See Morvay, supra note 72, at 98-99, where the literature and jurisprudence are
reviewed. See also Echterhlter, supra note 73, at 690-91.
85. Ger. Fed. Rep., Higher Administrative Court (Miinster), Judgment of November
25, 1955, 9 N.J.W. 1374 (1956), 2 Yearbook 572 (1958-59).
86. Id. at 1375, 2 Yearbook at 580.
87. See Ger. Fed. Rep., Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of May 10, 1957,
6 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 389 (1956-57), 2 Yearbook 594 (1958-59);
Ger. Fed. Rep., Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of June 27, 1957, 25 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes (Zivilsachen) 60 (1958), 2 Yearbook 596 (1958-59); Ger. Fed. Rep.,
Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of April 21, 1959, 13 Entscbeidungen des Bundesgerichts-
hofes (Strafsachen) 102 (1960); Ger. Fed. Rep., Higher Administrative Court (Miinster),
Judgment of November 25, 1955, 9 N.J.W. 1374 (1956), 2 Yearbook 572 (1958-59); Ger.
Fed. Rep., Appeals Court (Oberlandesgericht/Bremen), Judgment of February 17, 1960, 13
N.J.W. 1265 (1960), 3 Yearbook 634 (1960).
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and all state legislation regardless of the date of enactment. 8 Thus, one
German court set aside an otherwise valid detention order on the ground that
it violated Article 5 (3) of the Convention." In another very interesting case,
a decree expelling a Belgian national from Germany was quashed, because
the court concluded that its execution would amount to a serious interference
with petitioner's right to a family life as guaranteed in Article 8 of the Con-
ventionY0 The Belgian had been convicted of a sex offense in 1951, but his
residence permit was not withdrawn at that time (as it was in. the power of
the government to do), due to the fact that, as a farm laborer, his services
were found to be indispensable to his German employer. In 1953 petitioner
married a German woman with two German-born illegitimate children not
fathered by him. Thereafter, in 1953, a child was born to the couple. In 1954,
by which time he had obtained other employment, he was served with an
expulsion order withdrawing his residence permit. In setting aside this order,
the court pointed out that under the Basic Law and Article 8 of the Conven-
tion "the family is under the special protection of the State." Accordingly,
"if the unity and integrity of the family are threatened, the interests of family
protection must be taken into account and set against other public interests." 9'
This, the court concluded, was not done here.
Should the expulsion order be put into effect, the wife will there-
fore be obliged either to follow her husband and part from the illegiti-
mate children born to her before her marriage, who are still very young,
or to part from her husband in order to remain with her children.
It is probable, of course, that a way of reuniting the family will
eventually be found, but, in view of the circumstances, the separa-
tion is likely to continue for some time.
The unity of the family will be compromised by this separa-
tion. It is true that he has no parental connection with the children
born to his wife before the marriage, but the children must neverthe-
less be reckoned as belonging to his family, within the meaning of
the above-mentioned provisions; they live in his home and, in view
of their age, need the care of their mother.
Since, for these reasons, the expulsion order represented a serious
threat to the plaintiff's family, it was necessary to consider whether
the special conditions laid down in Article 8 [2] of the Convention as a
justification for such a threat were fulfilled.9 2
The court then concluded that these conditions had not been fulfilled, 93 so that
88. Echterhblter, supra note 73; Minch, supra note 77, at 154; Wendt, Zur Frage der
innerstaatlichen Geltung und Wirkung der Europiiischen Konvention zum Schutze der
Menschenrechte, 9 Monatsschrift flir deutsches Recht 658 (1955).
89. Ger. Fed. Rep., Appeals Court (Oberlandesgericht/Saarbriicken), judgment of
November 9, 1960, 14 N.J.W. 377 (1961).
90. Ger. Fed. Rep., Federal Administrative Court, judgment of October 25, 1956, 72
Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 57 (1957), 2 Yearbook 584 (1958-59).
91. Id. at 57, 2 Yearbook at 590.
92. Id. at 58, 2 Yearbook at 590-92.
93. Id. at 58, 2 Yearbook at 592. Article 8(2) of the Convention provides:
There shall be no interference by the public authority with the exercise of this right
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the expulsion order had to be set aside. This judgment was followed in a more
recent German case which reached a similar result.04
Mention might also be made of a 1957 judgment of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, in which the defendant challenged the constitutionality of German
penal provisions punishing homosexual activities. In the course of its decision,
that tribunal stated:
Irrespective of the Applicant's allegations it is necessary for the Court
to examine ex officio the question of whether Articles 175 et seq. of the
Penal Code are or are not consistent with the Convention, in view of
the fact that after its ratification . . . the said Convention entered
into force in the Federal Republic on 3rd September 1953 ... and the
Applicant R. was not sentenced until 14th October 1953, after the
Convention had entered into force. If Articles 175 et seq. of the Penal
Code had been abrogated by the provisions of the Human Rights Con-
vention, the Applicant would have been sentenced under a penal law
no longer in force and his plea of unconstitutionality would have to
be entertained.95
The court found, however, that the challenged provisions of the German Penal
Code had not been abrogated by the Convention, since the punishment of
homosexual activity was a measure necessary for the protection of health and
morals within the meaning of Article 8(2). 96 It is noteworthy that this con-
clusion finds support in the jurisprudence of the European Commission of
Human Rights. The Commission recently rendered the following judgment:
[T]he Commission has already decided on many occasions that
the Convention allows a High Contracting Party to punish homo-
sexuality since the right to respect for private life may, in a demo-
cratic society, be subject to interference as provided for by the law
of that Party for the protection of health or morals (Article 8(2) of
the Convention); whereas it is clear from the foregoing that Article
175 of the German Criminal Code is in no way in contradiction with the
provisions of the Convention; whereas it thus appears that this part of
the Application is manifestly ill-founded and must be declared inad-
missible under Article 27(2) of the Convention; . . . 7
[to private and family life] except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
A valuable discussion of this case may be found in Golsong, The European Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in a German Court, 33
Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 317 (1958).
94. Ger. Fed. Rep., Higher Administrative Court (Miinster), Judgment of August 2,
1960, 13 Verwaltungsrechtsprechung in Deutschland 199 (1961), 4 Yearbook 618 (1961). But
see Ger. Fed. Rep., Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of December 15, 1955, 3
Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 58 (1957).
95. Ger. Fed. Rep., Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of May 10, 1957, 6
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 389, 440 (1956-57), 2 Yearbook 594 (1958-59)
(excerpted report).
96. Id. at 441, not excerpted in Yearbook.
97. Application No. 530/59, Decision of January 4, 1960, 3 Yearbook 184, 194 (1960).
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It thus appears that, while the Convention is not in Germany a norm in
the nature of a constitutional law, it does have the status of an ordinary fed-
eral law. As such, it can be effectively invoked in German courts9" and guar-
antees to those subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic additional
civil rights. While subsequent federal legislation would supersede any incon-
sistent provisions of the Convention, it is most unlikely that such action will
be taken in the foreseeable future.
GREEcE
Under Greek law an international agreement becomes domestic law fol-
lowing the enactment of legislation approving and reproducing the treaty.99
Theoretically, it is not the treaty that is internally enforceable, but the law
incorporating it into the domestic legal order. 00 Thus transformed, a treaty
gains the status of an ordinary law, with the result that it abrogates prior
inconsistent legislation and may itself be superseded by a later law in conflict
with it. 10 ' But even though an international convention has been promulgated
in the manner indicated above, the courts might still conclude that all or some
of its provisions are non-self-executing. In that case, and until the requisite
implementing legislation has been enacted, such a treaty cannot abrogate or
modify prior laws.102
In view of the fact that the Convention was approved by the requisite
legislation,10 3 it has gained the status of Greek law.0 4 The available case law
indicates, furthermore, that Greek courts have so far not questioned the self-
executing nature of its operative provisions. That is to say, these courts have
proceeded on the assumption that these provisions were directly applicable
Greek law and did not require any additional implementing legislation. Thus,
for example, the Greek Supreme Court, after noting that the Convention had
become Greek law, ruled that -a law licensing and regulating the construction
98. See Stisterhenn, L'application de la Convention sur le plan du Droit Interne, 10
Annales 303, 311-14 (1961).
99. Kyriacopoulos, Le Droit International et la Constitution Hell~nique de 1952, in
Gegenwartsprobleme des Internationalen Rechtes und der Rechtsphilosophie 201, 211 (1953) ;
Papacostas, L'autoritJ des Conventions internationales en Grace, 15 Revue Hell6nique de
Droit International 361, 363 (1962).
100. Valticos, Monisme on Dualisine? Les rapports des traitis et de la loi en Grace(specialement t propos des conventions internationales du travail), 11 Revue Hellinique
de Droit International 203, 208 (1958).
101. Patras, L'autorit en Droit interne hellinique des Traitis internationaux, 15 Revue
Hellnique de Droit International 348, 360 (1962), and cases discussed therein; Papacostas,
supra note 99, at 362-63.
102. Valticos, supra note 100, at 224. The courts have the power, furthermore, to
determine whether a treaty or some of its provisions conflict with the Greek constitution
and to refuse enforcement if that should be the case. Patras, supra note 101, at 360; Valticos,
supra note 100, at 223.
For a study comparing the Convention with the pertinent provisions of the Greek
constitution and the argument that no conflict exists between these two instruments, see
Kyriacopoulos, Zur Einwirkung der Eitropdischen Menschenrechtskonvention auf die
Verfassung Griechenlands, in Grundprobleme des Internationalen Rechts 285, 304-06 (1957).
103. Greece, Law No. 2329, [1953] Official Journal, I, No. 68 (March 3, 1953).
104. Kyriacopoulos, supra note 102.
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and maintenance of religious edifices did not infringe upon religious freedom
guaranteed in Article 9(1) of the Convention. The court noted that the law
in question, besides being non-discriminatory in nature, came within the scope
of Article 9(2), which permits states to enact laws restricting the exercise
of religious freedom to the extent that such laws are necessary in a democratic
society in the interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.'0°
The Council of State, Greece's highest administrative tribunal, has also
repeatedly asserted that the Convention has "force of law" in Greece. 10 But
it should be noted, on the other hand, that this court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over questions involving possible abuse of administrative power and
related areas (e.g., arrest and detention for political crimes), has consistently
misinterpreted the Convention. The reasoning of this court has been so blatantly
erroneous that one may seriously question whether the Convention is being
properly implemented in Greece. For instance, in a 1954 judgment the Council
of State ruled that a petitioner could not invoke Article 5 of the Convention
to challenge his continued detention under a 1948 emergency measue enacted
to cope with the Communist insurrection. The court took the position that,
since Article 15(1) of the Convention permits states "in time of war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation" to take measures derogating
from the obligations they have assumed under the Convention, petitioner
could not complain even if his detention violated Article 5 and that it was
accordingly unnecessary to determine this question.10 7 The Council of State
adopted this same reasoning in two 1961 decisions, 08 implying, furthermore,
that the determination of whether a public emergency threatening the life of
the nation exists is not subject to judicial review.
These conclusions must, for a number of reasons, be considered erroneous.
The laws challenged in the three cases decided by the Council of State were
being enforced in Greece at the time that country ratified the Convention.
Pursuant to Article 64 of the Convention, Greece could have reserved the right
to enforce these laws, since Article 64(1) provides:
Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing
its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any par-
ticular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in
force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reserva-
tions of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article.
Since Greece did not register any reservation with regard to the laws here in
105. Greece, Supreme Court (Arios Pagos), Case No. 386/1955, 9 Revue Hellinique de
Droit International 206 (1956), 2 Yearbook 606 (1958-59).
106. See, e.g., Greece, Council of State, Case No. 724/1954, 7 Revue HelI~nique de
Droit International 278 (1954).
107. Ibid.
108. Greece, Council of State, Case No. 35/1961; Greece, Council of State, Case No.
182/1961. For a French translation of these cases and Case No. 1442/1955, infra note 114,
I am most indebted to the Hellenic Institute of International and Foreign Law and its
distinguished director, Professor Pan. J. Zepos.
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question, 10 9 it would seem to have waived its right to enforce them. But even
if one were to assume that the right of derogation is not lost with regard to
laws in force at the time the Convention was ratified, because such laws merely
provide for the exercise of extraordinary powers in a national emergency
sanctioned under Article 15(1), the state exercising such powers would have
to comply with the procedure established in Article 15(3). It stipulates that
a state invoking the right of derogation "shall keep the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken
and the reasons therefor." This Greece failed to do. That a timely notification
to the Secretary-General of a state's intention to exercise its right of derogation
is a condition which must be complied with would seem to be apparent from
the wording of Article 15(3). Whatever doubt there may have existed with
regard to this question was resolved by the Human Rights Court in the
Lawless case. 110 The Court there agreed with the Human Rights Commission
that a state may only rely on Article 15 if it notified the Secretary-General
without delay of the measuers of derogation taken by it together with the
reasons therefor."- Finally, the assertion by the Greek Council of State that
a derogation exercised by a state is not subject to judicial review, finds no
support whatsoever in the text of the Convention. Needless to say, if such
an argument were accepted, it would enable governments to freely nullify the
rights guaranteed in the Convention, reducing it to a lofty but in practice
ineffective statement of principle. It is, therefore, significant that the Human
Rights Court in the Lawless case left no doubt about the fact that it considered
the exercise of the right of derogation to be subject to judicial review ." As a
result, since the Convention has become Greek law, it is difficult to see how a
Greek court can, in reliance on the right of derogation, apply a law in conflict
with the Convention, if such law was enacted before the effective date of the
Convention, without at least determining whether the right of derogation
was duly exercised." 3
It is thus apparent that, regardless of the fact that the Convention has
become Greek law, it has so far not been effectively enforced in Greece. That
the courts are not entirely to blame for this unsatisfactory state of affairs may
be illustrated by considering a 1955 case. 1 4 Petitioner here challenged a
1945 emergency measure by alleging that his continued detention under it
violated the Convention. The Council of State found, however, that parliament
109. The only reservation made by Greece relates to Article 2 of the Protocol, which
deals with the right to education and was not involved in the cases here under discussion.
110. "Lawless" Case (Merits), judgment of July 1, 1961, 4 Yearbook 438 (1961).
(This case will be more fully discussed on pp. 374-76 infra.)
111. Id. at 484-86.
112. Id. at 472.
113. The situation would be different, of course, if the law alleged to be in conflict
with the Convention were later in date. In such a case, a Greek court would have no choice,
under Greek constitutional law, but to apply the most recent legislition.
114. Greece, Council of State, Case No. 144/1955. This case is discussed in Papacostas,
supra note 99, at 365.
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had. extended the effective date of this law by legislation enacted after the
Convention entered into force in Greece. Since under Greek law, as we have
seen, a later law supersedes a prior inconsistent treaty provision, the tribunal
had no choice but to give effect to the will of the legislature and to reject the
appeal.
Now it might be that none of the challenged laws actually violate the
Convention.1 1 4 a What is most regrettable, however, is that those subject to Greek
jurisdiction are for all practical purposes deprived of the right to have that
question effectively determined by Greek courts. This is especially serious,
because Greece recognizes neither the compulsory jurisdiction of the Human
Rights Court nor the right of private parties to appeal to the European Com-
mission of Human Rights.
IRELAND
The Constitution of Ireland provides that "no international agreement
shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the
Oireachtas."1" 5 And Article 15.2(1) of the Irish Constitution stipulates that
"the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested
in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws for
the State." It thus appears that, unless the Oireachtas (Parliament) has
enacted a law implementing a treaty ratified by Ireland, it merely binds that
country internationally without, however, creating any rights or duties en-
forceable in Irish courts."16
While Ireland deposited its ratification of the Convention on February 25,
1953, and also recognized the right of private petition as well as the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court, no implementing legislation has
as yet been promulgated by the Oireachtas. The Convention has, nevertheless,
been invoked in the Irish courts in a very interesting case arising out of a
habeas corpus proceeding instituted by one Lawless. 117 Suspected of being
a member of outlawed Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.), he was arrested for
allegedly engaging in activities prejudicial to the security of the state and
placed under preventive detention, all in accordance with the provisions of
the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940.118 In challenging the
114a. In a March 1, 1964 news dispatch from Athens, the New York Times reported
that the new Greek government under Premier Papandreou plans to seek the enactment of a
law, which "would free about two-fifths of Greek Communist prisoners, abolish political
deportation and remove regulations under which the police can veto any applicant for work
on political grounds." N. Y. Times, March 2, 1964, p. 8, col. 4. In view of these developments,
it is not unreasonable to assume that Greece might now recognize the right of private petition
to the Commission and the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court.
115. Constitution of Ireland, Art. 29.6. The Oireachtas consists of the President, the
House of Representatives (Dkil Eireann) and the Senate (Seanad Eireann). See Constitution
of Ireland, Art. 15.1.(2).
116. See Lang, A Constitutional Aspect of Economic Integration: Ireland and the
European Common Market, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 552, 561 (1963).
117. In re OLaighlis (Lawless), [1963] Ir. R. 93 (1957), aff'd, [1960] Ir. R. 109 (1957).
118. Ireland, Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940 (No. 2 of 1940).
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legality of his detention, Lawless relied, among other grounds, on Article 5
and 6 of the Convention. Aware of the fact that Ireland's ratification of the
Convention did not effect its transformation into domestic law, counsel for
Lawless' 9 made a rather ingenious argument to overcome this legal obstacle.
He submitted that the government, having ratified the Convention and having
bound itself to perform its obligations thereunder, should be estopped from
asserting the right to exercise powers in violation of the Convention. But the
High Court 120 as well as the Supreme Court'121 rejected this proposition. After
indicating that the Oireachtas had not determined that the Convention was to
be part of the domestic law, the Supreme Court emphasized that, in accordance
with the explicit stipulations of the Irish Constitution, "this Court cannot give
effect to the Convention if it be contrary to the domestic law or purports to
grant rights or impose obligations additional to those of domestic law."' 22
Then, addressing itself specifically to counsel's argument, the Supreme Court
ruled:
The Court accordingly cannot accept the idea that the primacy
of domestic legislation is displaced by the State becoming a party to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Nor can the Court accede to the view that in the domestic
forum the Executive is in any way estopped from relying on the do-
mestic law. It may be that such estoppel might operate as between
the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, . . . but it cannot
operate in a domestic Court administering domestic law.123
Counsel's attempt to obtain Lawless' release by urging the Supreme Court to
construe the Act of 1940 in such a manner as not to violate general rules of
international law-a status which he sought to attribute to Articles 5 and 6
of the Convention-also failed since, in the Supreme Court's view, domestic
laws must prevail against inconsistent provisions of international law.' 24  It
is thus apparent that the Convention cannot be successfully invoked in Irish
courts against conflicting prior or subsequent domestic legislation.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that Lawless submitted his case to
the European Commission of Human Rights. The Commission ruled that his
This law supplemented the Offences Against the State Act, 1939 (No. 13 of 1939). Both
were designed to check the illegal activities of the I.R.A. See generally Kelly, Fundamental
Rights in the Irish Law and Constitution 52-59 (1961). Section 4 (1) of the 1940 law
empowers a Minister of State to issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of a person
believed by him to be engaged in activities prejudicial "to the preservation of public peace
and order or to the security of the State." Section 3 (2) conditions the exercise of this power
upon a governmental proclamation declaring that it is necessary and expedient to invoke
the powers conferred in the Act "to secure the preservation of public peace and order."
119. Lawless was represented by Sean MacBride, former Irish Minister for External
Affairs, and present Secretary-General of the International Commission of jurists.
120. In re 6Laigl6is (Lawless), [1960] Ir. R. 93, 102-04 (1957).
121. Id. at 124-26.
122. Id. at 125.
123. Ibid.
124. In re OLaiglhis (Lawless), [1960] Ir. R. 93, 124 (1957).
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petition was admissible 125 and referred it to the Human Rights Court on
April 12, 1960, where it became the first case to be decided by that Court.120
The Court found that Lawless' detention violated Articles 5 (1) (c) and 5 (3) 12
of the Convention, since it was not imposed for the purpose of bringing him,
within a reasonable time, before a competent judicial authority to determine
the legality of his detention or to pass upon the merits of the charges against
him. 128 It ruled, however, that the Irish government had nevertheless not acted
unlawfully, since Article 15 of the Convention permits a state in time of war
or other pubilc emergency threatening the life of the nation to take measures
derogating from its obligations under the Convention "to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, . . ." The Irish government had
notified the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe in 1957 that it was
compelled to invoke Article 15, in order to cope with the terrorist activities of
the I.R.A. In the Court's view, Ireland properly exercised its right of deroga-
tion, considering the circumstances prevailing within its territory at that time.
Accordingly, after finding that the measures taken against Lawless were within
the scope of Ireland's derogation, the Court dismissed the appeal. 129
ITALY
While the Convention was ratified by Italy in 1955, it is still too early
to say what domestic status it thereby acquired. As a general rule, a treaty
approved by parliament becomes Italian law. 130 As such it is capable of
abrogating prior laws inconsistent with it,131 but "a subsequent legislative act
can modify or even invalidate a prior treaty.' 3 2 Since the constitutionality of
statutes is subject to judicial review by the Constitutional Court, 33 that same
tribunal may also review the constitutionality of treaties.' 34
125. Application No. 332/57, Decision of August 30, 1958, 2 Yearbook 308 (1958-59).
126. See "Lawless" Case (Preliminary Objections and Questions of Procedure), Judg-
ment of November 14, 1960, 3 Yearbook 492 (1960); "Lawless" Case (Merits), Judgment
of July 1, 1961, 4 Yearbook 438 (1961).
127. For text of Article 5, see note 46 supra.
128. "Lawless" Case (Merits), supra note 126, at 464-66.
129. Id. at 486. For a discussion of this case, see O'Higgins, The Lawless Case, [1962)
Camb. L.J. 234; Robertson, Lawless v. The Government of Ireland (Second Phase), 37
Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 537 (1962).
130. Italy, Combes de Lestrade v. Ministry of Finance, Court of Cassation, Judgment
of October 31, 1955, [19561 Jurisprudentia Italiana, I, p. 128, [1955) Int'l L. Rep. 882;
Mosler, L'application du Droit international public par les tribunaux nationaux, 91 Recuell
des Cours 619, 638 (1957).
131. Sereni, The Italian Conception of International Law 322-23 (1943).
132. Bebr, judicial Control of the European Communities 223 (1962).
133. Cassandro, The Constitutional Court of Italy, 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 4 (1959);
Sanduli, Die Verjassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Italien, in Heidelberg Colloquium on Constitu-
tional Jurisdiction 292, 305 (Mosler ed. 1962) ; Telchini, La Cour constitutionnelle en Italic,
15 Revue Internationale de Droit Compar6 33, 38 (1963).
134. De Visseher, La CommunautJ Europenne du Charbon et de lacier et les Etats
membres, in 2 Actes Officiels du Congr& International d'Etudes sur ]a C.E.C.A. 7, 50 (1957) ;
Bebr, op. cit. supra note 132, at 223. While Article 10(1) of the Italian Constitution stipulates
that "the Italian juridical system conforms to the generally recognized principles of inter-
national law," 2 Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations 482 (2d ed. 1956), this provision is under-
stood not to include treaties. Fiore, The Relation of the International to the Domestic Law
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While the Convention accordingly became Italian law, due to its promul-
gation by the Italian parliament,135 it may well be significant that the legis-
lators apparently could not agree upon the legal effect produced by this trans-
formation.' 30 Thus the standing committee on foreign and colonial affairs of
the Chamber of Deputies assumed, as its report indicates, that the Convention
did not create rights directly enforceable within the member states, but that
it merely formulated general obligations binding the signatories on the inter-
national plane. In other words, that the Convention was not self-executing in
nature.1 37 On the other hand, the Senate's counterpart of this committee
reached the opposite conclusion, when it asserted that Italian courts were bound
to apply the Convention and that additional implementing legislation was not
necessary to achieve this result.138 The courts apparently have not as yet
had an opportunity to pass on this question, although the Convention was
invoked before the Italian Constitutional Court in a case involving legislation
dealing with bi-lingualism in the Alto Adige (South Tyrol) province. 3 9 With-
out addressing itself to the legal status of the Convention in Italy, the Consti-
tutional Court merely pointed out that the Convention could not affect the out-
come of the case, since the challenged Italian law guaranteed German-speaking
Italian citizens greater rights than were available under the Convention. 4 °
Thus, no meaningful conclusion can be drawn from this judgment, since the
Constitutional Court did not have to decide the crucial question whether the
Convention, had it required a more favorable treatment than was provided
under the challenged Italian law, would have modified or abrogated the latter.
Therefore, for the time being, no definite answer can be given to this question.' 4 '
It may well be significant, however, that Italy has as yet recognized
neither the competence of the Commission to accept individual petitions, nor the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court and that, in defending this
position, the Italian Foreign Minister made the following statement in 1961:
In view of the important repercussions that decisions of the
[Human Rights] Court might have on the Italian legal system, our
Government . . . have thought it best not to adhere to certain more
specifically binding clauses of the Convention until these have been
accepted by almost all the member States ....
and the Italian Constitution, in 1 Aktuelle Probleme des Internationalen Rechtes 165,
171 and 175-76 (Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Gruppe der AAA, 1957).
135. Law of August 4, 1955, No. 848, [1955] Gazetta Ufficiale, No. 221, p. 3372.
136. For a summary of Italian legislative debates and committee reports dealing with
the Convention, see Partsch, Die europdische Menschenrechtskonvention vor den nationalen
Parlamenten, 17 Zeitschrift ffir ausliindisches Uffentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht 93, 127-31
(1956-57).
137. Id. at 130.
138. Id. at 128. One commentator assumes on the basis of the Senate report that the
Convention has become directly applicable Italian law. Stisterhenn, L'application de la
Convention sur le plan du Droit Interne, 10 Annales 303, 310 (1961).
139. Italy, Pres. Regione Trentino-Alto Adige v. Pres. Cons. ministri, Constitutional
Court, judgment of March 11, 1961, 44 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 670 (1961).
140. Id. at 676.
141. But see Siisterhenn, supra note 138, at 310.
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It should be added that for States such as Italy, where there is
complete separation of powers, adherence to Article 46 [compulsory
jurisdiction clause] might create very serious difficulties ....
In order to comply with a decision of the [Human Rights] Court
affording just satisfaction [Article 50], the Italian domestic system
would have to be adjusted in certain particulars, and this raises the
problem of whether and how it could in practice be adapted to a
specific obligation of this kind.142
Implicit in this assertion may be the government's belief that the Convention
is not directly applicable domestic law. For, if the Convention could be
effectively invoked in Italian courts, it might be argued that the problems
anticipated by the Foreign Minister would be less likely to arise. But since
Italian courts are not bound to adopt the government's characterization of an
international agreement, 143 it is possible that they might nevertheless determine
that the operative provisions of the Convention became directly enforceable
Italian law.
LUDxEmBoURG
The Luxembourg government and legislature, in considering the ratifica-
tion and approval of the Convention, apparently proceeded on the assumption
that it would take precedence over conflicting prior and subsequent domestic
enactments. 144 The legal basis for this assumption can be traced to relatively
recent but entirely unequivocal decisions of the highest Luxembourg courts
dealing with the domestic status of treaties. 45 These cases hold that inter-
national agreements duly approved by the legislature and published pursuant to
law not only supersede prior inconsistent legislation, but take precedence also
over subsequent laws in conflict with them.146 Thus, the Luxembourg Supreme
Court in 1950 set. aside a conviction on the theory that the law which the
defendant had violated was incompatible with the provision of a treaty and
could therefore not be invoked against him, even though it was later in date
than the treaty. The Supreme Court emphasized that "in case of a conflict
between the provisions of an international treaty and the provisions of a later
domestic law, the international law must prevail over the domestic law."
1 47
This doctrine was reiterated by the same tribunal in a later decision, in which
it pointed out that as a general rule the effect of conflicting successive laws
142. Italian Senate, February 25, 1961, 4 Yearbook 596-98 (1961).
143. Bebr, op. cit. supra note 132, at 223; Sereni, op. cit. supra note 131, at 324.
144. See Partsch, supra note 136, at 111-12.
145. For the most recent discussion of this case law, see Pescatore, L'autorit6, en droit
interne, des traitis internationaux selon la jurisprudence luxemnbourgeoise, 18 Pasicrisie
Luxembourgeoise [hereinafter cited as Pas. Lux.) 87 (1962).
146. Luxembourg, Chambre des Mitiers v. Pagani, Cour Suplrieure de Justice (Cassa-
tion criminelle), Judgment of July 14, 1954, 16 Pas. Lux. 150 (1954-56); Luxembourg,
Dieudonn6 v. Administration des Contributions, Conseil d'Etat (Comit6 du Contentieux),
Judgment of July 28, 1951, 15 Pas. Lux. 263 (1950-53) ; Luxembourg, Min. Publ. v. Brasseur,
Cour Sup~rieure de Justice (appel correctionnel), Judgment of July 21, 1951, 15 Pas. Lux.
233 (1950-53); Luxembourg, Huberty v. Min. Publ., Cour Sup~rieure de Justice (Cassation
criminelle), Judgment of June 8, 1950, 15 Pas. Lux. 41 (1950-53).
147. Luxembourg, Huberty v. Min. Publ., supra note 146 at 42 (Author's translation).
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depends upon the date of their promulgation. This, the Supreme Court ex-
plained, was not true, however, if the provisions of a treaty were incompatible
with a domestic law, since the former enjoyed a higher normative rank. Ac-
cordingly, a prior treaty provision, having received legislative approval, had to
prevail even over a later law.148 It is interesting to note, as one Luxembourg
commentator does, that the principle establishing the hierarchic supremacy
of treaties is entirely judge-made law.149 Pre-1950 jurisprudence, furthermore,
tended to equate international agreements to statute law, resolving any conflicts
between them by applying the later in time.150
Since the Convention was. duly approved by the Luxembourg legislature
and published in the manner stipulated by law,151 it should theoretically take
precedence over all prior and subsequent domestic laws provided, of course,
the particular provision is found to be self-executing in nature.1 2 A lower
Luxembourg tribunal, however, recently concluded that the Convention could
not be successfully invoked in the courts. 5 3 The defendant in this case was
found guilty and fined for charging a higher rental price for films than sanc-
tioned by Luxembourg law. He appealed this decision without, however, comply-
ing with a statutory provision, which stipulates that "an appeal shall be ad-
missible only if it is accompanied by a receipt for payment in full of the fine
imposed." The prosecution accordingly submitted that the appeal was inad-
missible, while the defense contended that this law violated the Luxembourg
Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention. The court sustained the prosecu-
tion's argument and, after examining the Convention as a whole, ruled that "the
rights and principles described in the Convention may not, under the terms of the
Convention, be appealed against or invoked directly before national courts but
may only be the subject of international appeals as laid down and stipulated in
the Convention.' 1 54 While it is difficult to see how the challenged law could
violate the Convention unless appellant might show that he had no money
to pay the fine, 155 the reasons given by the court in rejecting the appeal may
seriously be questioned. First, the court did not even refer to a prior case
in which the highest tribunal of the country, by implication at least, reached
148. Luxembourg, Chambre des M~tiers v. Pagani, supra note 146, at 152.
149. Pescatore, La pr6eeninence des traitgs sur la loi interne selon la jurisprudence
luxembourgeoise, 68 journal des Tribunaux 645 (1953).
150. Pescatore, L'autoriti, en droit interne, des traites internationaux selon la juris-
prudence luxernbourgeoise, 18 Pas. Lux. 87, 112-13 (1962).
151. Law of August 29, 1953, [19531 M6morial du Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg 1099.
Article 1(2) of this law provides that it be "executed and observed by all those whom it
may concern."
152. See Luxembourg, Brasserie Henri Funck et Cie v. Kieffer, Tribunal d'arrondisse-
ment de Luxembourg (Commerce), Judgment of December 8, 1960, 18 Pas. Lux. 553, 556-57
(1960-62), where Article 86 of the European Economic Community Treaty was ruled to be
non-self-executing in nature and thus could not be pleaded to invalidate a contractual
arrangement concluded by the parties.
153. Luxembourg, Court of Summary Jurisdiction, Judgment of October 24, 1960,
4 Yearbook 622 (1961).
154. Id. at 630.
155. For text of Article 6, see note 48 supra.
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a contrary conclusion.156 Here a conviction under a ministerial decree tempo-
rarily restricting the use of certain propulsion fuels was challenged on the
ground, inter alia, that it violated Article 5(1) of the Convention. While the
Supreme Court rejected this contention, it did so only after concluding that
no rights guaranteed in the Convention had been infringed.' 57 While not con-
clusive, this approach indicates that the Supreme Court apparently assumed
that the Convention was Luxembourg law and could be directly invoked in the
courts. Secondly, the lower court does not seem to say that Article 6 of the
Convention is too vague to be self-executing. Instead, it concludes that the
Convention by its terms creates rights enforceable only through an inter-
national appeal.
It is one thing to say that the domestic legal order does not afford a
person a remedy for a breach of a right guaranteed in the Convention. If true,
this is merely an admission that the state in question is not living up to its
international obligations. As the European Commission of Human Rights
pointed out some time ago,
. . . in accordance with the general principles of international law,
borne out by the spirit of the Convention as well as by the preliminary
work, the Contracting Parties have undertaken.., to ensure that their
domestic legislation is compatible with the Convention and, if need
be, to make any necessary adjustments to this end, since the Con-
vention is binding on all authorities of the Contracting Parties, in-
cluding the legislative authority .... 15
It is quite another thing to assert that the Convention by its terms creates
rights enforceable only through an international appeal. This is so patently
erroneous that it is difficult to believe that the court, despite its express
language, did not merely hold that Article 6 was non-self-executing. Other-
wise it is difficult to account for the unambiguous text of Article 13 of the
Convention, which provides:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.
Accordingly, while higher Luxembourg tribunals might reach the conclusion
that some of the provisions of the Convention are not self-executing under
Luxembourg law, it is reasonable to assume that they will not agree with the
lower court that the rights guaranteed in the Convention were designed to be
enforced only by appeals to the European Commission of Human Rights and
the Human Rights Court.
156. Luxembourg, Min. Publ. v. Wehrer, Cour Sup~ieure de Justice (Appel correc-
tionnel), Judgment of January 25, 1958, 17 Pas. Lux. 248 (1957-59).
157. Id. at 252.
158. Application No. 214/56, Decision of June 9, 1958, 2 Yearbook 214, 234 (1958-59).
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THE NETHERLANDS
The Law of May 22, 1953, effected a series of far-reaching changes in the
Dutch Constitution.'59 These were clarified by additional amendments enacted
in 1956.160 Article 66 of the Dutch Constitution, as thus amended, provides:
Legislation in force within the Kingdom shall not apply if its appli-
cation would be incompatible with provisions of [international] agree-
ments which are binding upon citizens and which have been entered
into either before or after the enactment of such legislation.161
And Article 60 states in part that "the judiciary are not empowered to pro-
nounce upon the constitutionality of [international] Agreements." These pro-
visions, to speak in general terms, assure the supremacy of treaties over all
other forms of domestic legislation.
162
An analysis of these provisions indicates that when Article 66 refers to
agreements "which are binding upon citizens" that the legislature had in mind
self-executing treaties. 163 Furthermore, reading Articles 66 and 60 together,
it is apparent, first, that, as far as the courts are concerned, such international
agreements take precedence over the Dutch Constitution itself' 64 and all other
forms of domestic legislation either prior or subsequent in time. 16 5 And second,
that it is for the courts to determine whether a conflict exists between a treaty
and domestic legislation, be it of a statutory or constitutional nature, and if
it is found to exist, to apply the treaty.' 66 Parenthetically, it might be noted
that the opponents of these constitutional changes acknowledged the necessity
159. Law of May 22, 1953, No. 261, [1953] Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Neder-
landen 451. An English translation of these amendments may be found in Inter-Parliamentary
Union, Constitutional and Parliamentary Information 104 (3d ser. 1953).
160. Law of September 11, 1956, No. 472; [19563 Staatsblad van bet Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden 1211. For English text, see Inter-Parliamentary Union, Constitutional and
Parliamentary Information 26 (3d ser. 1957).
161. I have preferred the English translation of this provision found in Erades & Gould,
The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and in the
United States: A Comparative Study 201 (1961), to that prepared by the Inter-Parliamentary
Union, op. cit. supra note 160, which reads:
Legislative provisions in force within the Kingdom shall not be applied in cases in
which such an application would be incompatible with clauses by which everyone
is bound contained in Agreements which have been concluded either before or after
the entry into force of such provisions.
162. See Van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and International Law, 47 Am.
J. Int'l L. 537, 553 (1953); Zimmermann, Die Neuregelung der auswdrtigen Gewalt in der
Verfassung der Niederlande, 15 Zeitschrift fiir ausliindisches 6ffentliches Recht und Vilker-
recht 164, 195 (1953/54). While these monographs deal with the 1953 amendments, they
apply with equal force to the 1956 amendments, since the latter, to a large extent, merely
clarified and rearranged the provisions in question.
163. Bauer, Die niederlindische Verfassungsdnderung von 1956 betreffend die aus-
wirtige Gewalt, 18 Zeitschrift fiir auslindisches Mffentliches Recht und V61kerrecht 137, 152
(1957/58) ; Erades & Gould, op. cit. supra note 161, at 325-26.
164. While the courts lack the power to rule that a treaty is unconstitutional, the
legislature would seem to be bound not to enact unconstitutional treaties.
165. This is the accepted view in the Netherlands. Erades & Gould, op. cit. supra note
161, at 416; Van Panhuys, supra note 162, at 557; Beaufort, Some Remarks about the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
in Varia Juris Gentium (Liber Amicorum presented to J. P. A. Franqois) 42, 45 (1959).
166. See Zimmermann, supra note 162, at 201; Van Panhuys, supra note 162, at 553.
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and advisability of providing for the hierarchic supremacy of treaties. They
thought it unwise, however, to empower the judiciary to decide whether or not
an international agreement conflicted with domestic laws preferring, instead,
to leave this determination to parliament. 6 7 This attitude may be attributed
to the fact that Dutch courts may not review the constitutionality of statutes. 10 8
Thus, the above constitutional amendments relating to treaties wrought funda-
mental changes in the previously existing balance of power between the legis-
lature and the judiciary.
The foregoing indicates that the operative provisions of the Convention
should prevail as against conflicting prior and later legislative enactments as
well as the Netherlands Constitution itself. Accordingly, a recent 'case'69
deserves special attention. The defendant Van Loon, a Roman Catholic priest,
had been ajudged guilty of conducting a Catholic service in a public place and
taking part in a religious procession on a public thoroughfare in violation of
Article 184 of the Dutch Constitution, which permits the celebration of religious
services only in buildings and other enclosed places. On appeal, an intermediate
appellate court set aside defendant's conviction on the ground that the consti-
tutional provision here in question was incompatible with Article 9 of the
Convention. Article 9(1) provides that everybody has the right to freedom
of religion and that this right includes the public or private manifestations of
one's religion or belief. Under Article 9(2) the freedom to manifest one's
religion or beliefs may be limited by laws "necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." The court
first found that the acts of which the defendant was charged bad to be regarded
as a public manifestation of the Catholic religion within the meaning of
Article 9(1) of the Convention. Interpreting the phrase "to manifest . . . in
public" as referring to religious services outside buildings and public places,
the court emphasized that "had there been any intention to limit this freedom
to the manifestation of religion in public within buildings and enclosed places,
that restriction would undoubtedly have been covered by Article 9.))170
The court then ruled that defendant's conviction could not be sustained as a
permissible limitation under Article 9 (2) of the Convention. Only the exception
for the "protection of.public order" could be relevant, but it was not applicable.
The court reached this conclusion by pointing out that it had not been proved
that the constitutional provision relied upon by the prosecution was necessary
167. For an extensive analysis of these debates see Zimmermann, supra note 162, at
197-201.
168. See Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Art. 131(2) (formerly
124(2)). (An English translation of the Constitution without the 1953 and 1956 amend-
ments may be found in 2 Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations 754 (2d ed. 1956)); see also
Erades & Gould, op. cit. supra note 161, at 414.
169. Netherlands, Public Prosecutor v. Van Loon, Court of Arnhem, Judgment of
March 8, 1961, 4 Yearbook 630 (1961).
170. Id. at 638.
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for the protection of public order or that it was enacted solely for its main-
tenance. Besides, since what is necessary for the protection of public order
should be decided in the light of present-day conditions, the enactment of
Article 184 of the Constitution, even if intended for the protection of public
order, "cannot be a valid standard for judging what is necessary for the pro-
tection of public order today (more than 100 years later) .... -71 The
prosecution appealed this decision to the Dutch Supreme Court which re-
versed. 172 While the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's argument that
the right to manifest one's religious beliefs in public as guaranteed in Article
9(1) of the Convention was designed as a protection only against the need to
worship in secret, it based its reversal of the lower court's judgment on the
theory that the law against public religious services was a measure for the
protection of public order within the meaning of Article 9(2) of the Convention.
The challenged law, the Supreme Court reasoned, had been intended and was
designed to prevent tension and agitation leading to disorder among Nether-
lands' mixed religious *population and must therefore be considered "as a
measure necessary for the protection of public order."'173 In its view, further-
more, the lower court had erred, because it had applied an improper standard
in deciding that the law under which defendant was sentenced was not neces-
sary for the protection of public order. A judge, the Supreme Court ruled,
may reach such a conclusion "only in the event of its being considered quite
unthinkable that a legislature faced with the need to adopt a regulation in this
matter . . . could adopt or maintain such a regulation in all equity .... ,,174
By applying this test, the court upheld the validity of the challenged law on
the theory that, even by present-day standards, it was not unreasonable for a
legislature to enact such a measure in order to forestall potential conflict
between different religious groups. 75
Even if one might disagree with the Supreme Court on its interpretation
of Article 9(2) of the Convention, it is clear that it and the intermediate
appellate tribunal both proceeded on the assumption that Article 9 was self-
executing in nature. 7 6 That is, had the Convention been found violated, Van
Loon's conviction would have been set aside. The Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion in a prior case' 77 where, however, it rejected a Protestant
clergyman's allegation that an Old People's Act, requiring him to contribute to
a pension plan, violated rights guaranteed in Article 9 of the Convention. To
171. Id. at 640 (Italics in the original).
172. Netherlands, Public Prosecutor v. Van Loon, Court of Cassation, Judgment of
January 19, 1962, 4 Yearbook 640 (1961).
173. Id. at 648.
174. Ibid.
175. Netherlands, Public Prosecutor v. Van Loon, Court of Cassation, Judgment of
January 19, 1962, 4 Yearbook 640, 650 (1961).
176. This view was confirmed in Netherlands, A.J.K. v. Public Prosecutor, Court of
Cassation, Judgment of May 5, 1959, reported in 8 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Interna-
tionaal Recht 73, 74 (1961).
177. Netherlands, Case No. 436, Court of Cassation (Third Chamber), Judgment of
April 13, 1960, 3 Yearbook 648 (1960).
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sustain its finding, the Supreme Court correctly noted that this provision of the
Convention "does not mean that anyone may be free to evade the enforcement
of laws even when they have nothing to do with the manifestation of religion
or beliefs .... 178
From the preceding it appears that in the Netherlands the Convention
enjoys a constitutionally guaranteed supremacy over prior and subsequent laws
as well as the Dutch Constitution itself. It is possible, of course, that Dutch
courts might conclude that some provisions of the Convention are by their
nature incapable of application by the courts without additional legislation. 70
Considering, however, that the Netherlands Supreme Court did not place
Article 9 of the Convention in that category, and that Article 66 of the Nether-
lands Constitution defines as self-executing those treaty provisions, which are
"binding upon citizens," it is unlikely that more than one or two operative
provisions would not meet this test.
SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES
In Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland, where the Convention was
ratified at an early date, parliamentary approval or ratification does not effect
the transformation of international agreements into domestic law.180 To
achieve such a transformation, separate implementing legislation has to be
enacted.' 8' This has not been done in any of these countries. But where the
respective legislatures considered that the Convention might conflict with
certain provisions of their domestic law, appropriate reservations were made.182
In this connection, it is interesting to note that Norway, which had made a
reservation with regard to Article 9 of the Convention, because Article 2 of the
Norwegian Constitution provided that "Jesuits shall not be tolerated," sub-
sequently deleted this provision from its Constitution and withdrew the
reservation. 8 3
To my knowledge, only an Icelandic court has expressly considered the
178. Id. at 670.
179. See, in this connection, Netherlands, X v. Inspector of Taxes, Court of Cassation,
Judgment of February 24, 1960, reported in 8 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal
Recht 285 (1961), where the court stated:
As the Court of Appeal said, Article 13 merely imposes upon the contracting States
the obligation to organize their legislation in such a way that in the cases defined by
that Article effective remedies will exist. The Court of Appeal rightly decided that
Article 13, according to its nature, cannot directly be applied by the Courts and
therefore, under Article 66 of the Constitution, does not belong to those provisions
of international agreements that are binding upon everyone and by which municipal
legislation shall be judged. Id. at 286.
180. See Sorensen, Principes de Droit international public, 101 Recueil des Cours 1, 118
(1960) ; Ross, Lehrbuch des V61kerrechts 69 (1951).
181. Sorensen, supra, at 118; Lochen & Torgersen, Norway's Views on Sovereignty
95-96 (1955).
182. Sweden made a reservation with regard to Article 2 of the Protocol, 1 Yearbook
44 (1955-57); Norway with regard to Article 9 of the Convention. Id. at 41-42. Denmark
and Iceland made no reservations.
183. Letter of December 4, 1956, by Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, 1 Yearbook 42 (1955-57).
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domestic status of the Convention. It ruled that, since the Convention "has
not been legalized in this country, neither as general nor as constitutional law,"
plaintiff could not rely upon it in challenging the legality of an Icelandic
revenue law.1 8 4 While the Convention was recently also invoked in the Nor-
wegian Supreme Court,18 5 that tribunal left unresolved the question concerning
the domestic status of the Convention. The case arose out of the conviction of
a dentist named Iversen for the violation of the Provisional Act of June 21,
1956, relating to obligatory public service for dentists. This law subjects
dentists completing their professional training after 1955 to compensated govern-
mental service as dentists for a period of one to two years in certain parts
of the country designated by the Ministry of Social Affairs. After serving in
such an assignment for a few months, Iversen left his post and advised the
Ministry that he was unwilling to perform "forced labour." He was tried and
sentenced to pay a substantial fine. This judgment was affirmed by the Nor-
wegian Supreme Court, where the defendant argued, inter alia, that the Act of
1956 violated Article 4 of the Convention. Article 4(2) provides that "no one
shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour." Article 4(3) (d)
qualifies the term "forced or compulsory labour" by stipulating that it shall
not include, among others, "any work or service which forms part of normal
civic obligations." Addressing himself directly to defendant's contention, Judge
Hiorthoy, speaking for the majority on the Court, ruled:
It seems hardly doubtful to me that the prohibition in the Con-
vention against subjecting anyone to perform "forced or compulsory
labour" cannot reasonably be given such a wide construction that it
includes instructions to perform public service of the kind in question
here. The present case concerns brief, well-paid work in one's own
profession in immediate connection with completed professional train-
ing. Although such injunctions [sic] may in many cases be in conflict
with the interests of the individual as he sees them in the moment, I
find it manifest that they cannot with any justification be charac-
terized as an encroachment on, still less a violation of any human
right. Accordingly, as I cannot see that there is any contradiction
between the Convention and the Norwegian Act in question, I need
not enter into the question as to which of these shall prevail in the
event of conflict.' 8 6
It may be assumed however that, if the Supreme Court had found that the
184. Iceland, Olafson v. Ministry of Finance, Municipal Court of Reykjavik, judg-
ment of June 28, 1960, 3 Yearbook 642, 646 (1960). This Icelandic revenue law was the
subject of an appeal to the Commission which held that it did not violate Article 1 of the
Protocol to the Convention. Application No. 511/59, Decision of December 20, 1960, 3
Yearbook 394 (1960).
185. Norway, Public Prosecutor v. Stein Andreas Iversen, Supreme Court, judgment
of December 16, 1961, [19611 Norsk Retstidende, II, 1350. (I am most indebted to the
Legal Department of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and its Deputy Director, Mr. Egil
Amlie, for providing me with an English translation of this decision, from which all English
quotations are taken. A report of this case, prepared by Prof. Hambro, may also be found
in 90 Journal du Droit International (Clunet) 788 (1963).)
186. Id. at 1351.
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Act of 1956 conflicted with the Convention, it would have had to give effect to
the Norwegian law. This result would seem to follow not only because the
law was later in date, but also because in Norway, as in Denmark, Sweden and
Iceland, an international agreement requires implementing legislation to be
capable of creating rights enforceable in the municipal tribunals. Thus, in
commenting on this case, Professor Hambro points out:
It is interesting that the Court in this case-as in many cases
before-discuss the possibility of a conflict between municipal law and
an international obligation in spite of the fact that the well nigh
unanimous doctrine in Norway states that Norwegian Courts must
apply Norwegian law even when this law is clearly in opposition to
international law.187
TulKEY
To ascertain the status of the Convention in Turkey is a most frustrating
endeavor. The rather extensive bibliographies dealing with the Convention
compiled in the Yearbooks of the European Convention on Human Rights
list only one entry pertaining to Turkey.188 The French-language law journal
published by the Law Faculty of the University of Istanbul' 80 contains no
case reports or articles dealing with the Convention. And this writer's com-
munications to some Turkish professors of constitutional and international law
have elicited no response whatsoever. As a result, the following report on the
domestic implementation of the Convention by Turkey is at best incomplete.
Turkey ratified the Convention in 1954.90 The Turkish Constitution then
in force' -' contained no express reference relating to the domestic status of
international agreements. It provided merely that "the Grand National
Assembly alone exercises such functions as enacting, modifying, interpreting,
and abrogating laws; concluding conventions and treaties and making peace
with foreign states; . . .,,119 This provision was interpreted to mean that a
treaty duly approved by the Grand National Assembly became domestic law.108
187. Hambro, supra note 186, at 790. One Norwegian author, however, has recently
advanced the theory, to judge from the English summary of his article, that the European
Convention of Human Rights cannot be equated, for the purpose of determining its domestic
legal status, to an ordinary treaty. Since, in his view, the Convention guarantees human
rights to all persons within the jurisdiction of the High Contracting Parties, they have a
right to the enforcement of the Convention regardless of the constitutional laws of the
individual states. Wold, Den europiiske -menneskerettskonvensjon og Norge, in Legal Essays:
A Tribute to Frede Castberg 353, 373 (1963). Whether a domestic court has the power to
enforce a right guaranteed in the Convention, if it conflicts with a municipal law, may well
be doubted.
188. The monograph listed is a doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of Law
of the University of Geneva by All Reza Gullu, entitled Les Droits de PHomme et ]a
Turquie (1958). Unfortunately it is of limited usefulness for purposes of our study.
189. It is published under the title of "Annales de la Facult6 de Droit d'Istanbul."
190. Turkey, Law No. 6366 of March 10, 1954, reprinted in 1 Yearbook 43 (1955-
1957).
191. See Turkey, Constitution of January 10, 1945, 3 Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations
404 (2d ed. 1956).
192. Constitution of January 10, 1945, Art. 26.
193. Gullu, Les Droits de l'Homme et ]a Turquie 69-71 (1958).
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Since, as above noted, the Convention was approved in that manner by the
Turkish parliament, it should have gained that status.194
Since there are no available judicial decisions dealing with the Conven-
tion,195 one can only speculate on the extent to which the Convention was
implemented in Turkey. It is common knowledge, however, that the Menderes
regime blatantly disregarded even the most elementary notions of human rights
by imprisoning political opponents, imposing press censorship, etc. Accord-
ingly, it may safely be assumed that during this era in Turkish history the Con-
vention was not an effective guarantee against deprivations of human rights.
But since Turkey recognized neither the competence of the Commission to
hear private appeals directed against Turkey nor the jurisdiction of the Human
Rights Court, it is impossible to assess the extent of such deprivations.
This situation may have been remedied with the overthrow of the Menderes
regime and the subsequent adoption of a new Turkish Constitution,196 which
contains significant new guarantees in the sphere of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms.197 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Article 65(5) of the
1961 Constitution expressly provides: "International treaties duly put into
effect shall carry the force of law. No recourse to the Constitutional Court
can be made as provided in articles 149 and 151 with regard to these treaties."
By virtue of this provision an international agreement like the Convention,
besides having the status of domestic legislation, may very well have gained
a preferred position vis-a-vis ordinary laws. This would follow from the fact
that, whereas ordinary laws may be challenged and annulled if they violate
the Constitution,'9" international treaties like the Convention are not subject
to direct constitutional review.' 99
In the light of these developments, it is premature to attempt to say how
Turkish courts will apply the Convention. The overthrow of the Menderes
regime and the apparent establishment of a constitutional democracy taken
together with the fact that the human rights guaranteed in the new Consti-
194. As such, the Convention could prevail over prior laws in conflict with it and
could itself probably be superseded by subsequent legislation. Gullu, op. cit. supra note 193,
at 71. Gulu, however, also suggests that a duly promulgated treaty could not be nullified by
an ordinary law later in time. Ibid. But this proposition may well be questioned, because he
bases this conclusion on the assertion that a treaty derives its legal force from international
law so that it cannot be abrogated by national legislation. Thus he apparently confuses the
continued international validity of a treaty, even after it has been unilaterally abrogated by
a later domestic law, with the internal effect of such a law.
195. The Yearbooks of the European Convention on Human Rights, which note national
court decisions involving the Convention, contain no reference to Turkish cases.
196. Constitution of the Turkish Republic of July 9, 1961, reprinted in Inter-
Parliamentary Union, Constitutional and Parliamentary Information 18 (3d ser. 1962).
197. See generally Giritli, Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution, 16 The
Middle East Journal 1 (1962).
198. Arik, La Cour constitutionnelle turque, 14 Revue Internationale de Droit Compari
401, 406 (1962); Balta, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Tirkei, in Heidelberg Collo-
quium on Constitutional Jurisdiction 550, 556-57 (Mosler ed. 1962).
199. Arik, supra note 198, at 407. Balta, supra note 198, at 562, however, points out
that the wording of Article 65(5) of the Constitution does not exclude the possibility of an
indirect constitutional review of treaties by lower courts.
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tution appear to be patterned on the Convention, are extremely significant
factors. They may well give added meaning to our rather general conclusion
that the Convention has become Turkish law.
UNITED KINGDOM
Under the constitutional law of the United Kingdom, a treaty does not
upon its ratification acquire the status of domestic law.2 0 As Lord Atkin
explained in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario:2 0t
Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that
the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of
its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law,
requires legislative action. Unlike some other countries, the stipu-
lations of a treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of
the treaty alone, have the force of law. 202
In other words, the provisions of a treaty have no force of law in United
Kingdom courts in the absence of implementing legislation.203 This is true
even if the particular international agreement is intended to be self-executing
in nature and uses language capable of such interpretation.2 04 As a matter
of fact, with the possible exception of treaties affecting belligerent rights
and diplomatic immunities, there is no such thing in British constitutional law
as a self-executing treaty.20 5
Although the United Kingdom was the first country to ratify the Con-
vention,20 6 no legislation implementing its provisions has as yet been enacted.20 7
Accordingly, the Convention cannot be successfully invoked in British courts
although, as Professor Waldock suggests, it might be utilized by the courts
"in dealing with doubtful points in the domestic system. ' '208 No such cases
have as yet been reported.
In this connection, it should be noted that the United Kingdom has as
200. McNair, The Law of Treaties 81-82 (1961).
201. [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (Can.).
202. Id. at 347.
203. See The Parlement Beige, 4 P.D. 129, 154-55 (1879), reversed on other grounds,
5 P.D. 197 (1880); Sinclair, The Principles of Treaty Interpretation and their Application
by the English Courts, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 508, 525 (1963); Wade & Phillips, Constitu-
tional Law 259 (6th ed. 1960).
204. See Marsh, Civil Liberties in Europe, 75 L.Q. Rev. 530, 535 (1959).
205. McNair, op. cit. supra note 200, at 81, 89-93.
206. The United Kingdom ratified the Convention on February 22, 1951, and de-
posited the instrument of ratification on March 8, 1951.
207. Here it might be noted that in ratifying the Protocol to the Convention, the
United Kingdom availed itself of the right under Article 64 to stipulate the following
reservations:
.. in view of certain provisions of the Education Acts in force in the United
Kingdom, the principle affirmed in the second sentence of Article 2 [of the Protocol]
is accepted by the United Kingdom only so far it is compatible with the provision
of efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of unreasonable public
expenditure.
1 Yearbook 45 (1955-57).
208. Waldock, The European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
34 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 356, 358 (1959).
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yet neither recognized the competence of the Commission to receive, pursuant
to Article 25, private petitions, nor accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Human Rights Court under Article 46. While the British government has
been severely criticized in the House of Commons for not taking these steps,20 9
it has shown no intention to make these declarations. Illustrative of its policy
is the following government statement made in response to a question from
the floor of the House of Commons:
The position which Her Majesty's Government have continuously
taken up is that they do not recognise the right of individual petition,
because they take the view that States are the proper subject of inter-
national law and if individuals are given rights under international
treaties, effect should be given to those rights through the national law
of the States concerned. The reason why we do not accept the idea
of compulsory jurisdiction of a European court is because it would
mean that British codes of common and statute law would be subject
to review by an international court. For many years it has been the
position of successive British Governments that we should not accept
this status. 210
Even if one were to accept the government's position that, "if individuals are
given rights under international treaties, effect should be given to those rights
through the national law of the States concerned," it should be pointed out
that the United Kingdom has failed to do that very thing. Of course, the
real reason for British reluctance to permit individual appeals to the European
Commission and to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court may be
traced to another problem. The United Kingdom, after ratifying the Conven-
tion, extended its application to many British colonial territories.211 While
the Convention in Article 15 permits derogations from the obligations assumed
by the member states to deal with certain public emergencies, the legality of
such derogations might be challenged by individuals, if private appeals could
be instituted against the United Kingdom. 212 This the British government
209. For excerpts from relevant House of Commons debates, see 2 Yearbook 546-60
(1958-59) and 3 Yearbook 598-612 (1960).
210. Reply by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ormsby-Gore) in the
House of Commons on November 26, 1958, quoting from prior Government statement, 2
Yearbook 546 (1958-59). Parenthetically it might be noted that this statement was quoted
in the Netherlands Parliament as indicative of British attitude towards European integration
and to demonstrate how unrealistic it was to expect British membership in the European
Common Market. Mr. Van Der Goes Van Naters, Second Chamber of the Netherlands
States-General, 15th Sitting, November 17, 1959, reported in 3 Yearbook 548, 576-78 (1960).
211. See Letter to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe by the Permanent
United Kingdom Representative to the Council of Europe, dated October 23, 1953, with list
of territories, reprinted in 1 Yearbook 46-47 (1955-57). This declaration was made pursuant
to the provisions of Article 63 of the Convention. See note 216 infra.
212. Even now, of course, another member state could challenge the legality of such
a derogation or, for that matter, any other British action, which it might deem violative of
the obligations assumed by the United Kingdom under the Convention. See Convention,
Art. 24. But states are, for political reasons, generally reluctant to take such steps. Greece
did take such action against the United Kingdom at the time of the Cyprus dispute, but
withdrew its complaint as a result of the settlement of the Cyprus Question. See 2 Yearbook
175-96 (1958-59).
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wants to avoid, for it considers the exercise of the right of derogation to be
a purely political decision, which should not be subject to judicial review.218
Besides, the United Kingdom is also concerned with the political problems
that private appeals from the colonies might create. This fear was articulated
in the House of Commons by the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs in the following manner:
Among emerging communities political agitators thrive and one may
well imagine the use which political agitators would make of the right
of individual petition. For every one grievance which had some sub-
stance there would be a hundred put up for political purposes only.214
While some other signatory states run similar risks, albeit on a much smaller
scale, one might well echo the remarks of Mr. Anthony Kershaw who, in
advocating British recognition of the right of individual petition and the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court, stated in the House of
Commons:
It may be that the price which we have to pay for this form of inter-
national co-operation is too high, but I think that we should realise
that in every form of international co-operation, every form of treaty
into which we enter, there is a price which must be paid. 215
Leaving aside the special problems involved in the administration of justice
in the colonial territories,210 it may well be that the human rights guaranteed
in the Convention are already adequately protected under the domestic laws
of the United Kingdom. But if the Convention is to be fully implemented,
an individual subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom should be
able to have this proposition tested by an impartial body like the Commission
and, if necessary, by the Human Rights Court. Furthermore, even though the
United Kingdom is legally free not to permit private appeals to these institu-
tions, it should and *must, if it is to discharge the obligations incumbent upon
it under the Convention, allow.its own courts to pass upon these questions.
And since, in addition to Ireland, the United Kingdom is the only other com-
mon-law signatory of the Convention, British courts would have a valuable
contribution to make in developing the law of the Convention. Accordingly,
one cannot but share the sentiments of one eminent British jurist, who states:
In so far as we in this country have a conception of civil liberty
which is of value-although some Continental comparisons may show
that it is by no means comprehensive-it may be thought regrettable
213. See Statement by the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the
House of Commons on June 25, 1959, reported in 9 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 314-15 (1960).
214. House of Commons, Debate of May 23, 1960, Reply by the Joint Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Robert Allan), to Anthony Kershaw, M. P., reprinted in
3 Yearbook 606, 612 (1960).
215. House of Commons Debate of May 23, 1960, 3 Yearbook 598, 604-06 (1960).
216. The United Kingdom's concern over the application of the Convention which it
extended to many of its colonies under Article 63, is largely unjustified, because Article
63(3) stipulates that "the provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such territories
with due regard, however, to local requirements." (Emphasis added.)
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that our courts do not have an opportunity to interpret a Convention
to which as a State we have subscribed. It is not easy to convince a
foreign lawyer that it would be catastrophic for Parliament to pass a
law giving legal effect to a Convention which we have signed and
ratified.217
CONCLUSION
Our study indicates that the Convention lacks the status of domestic
law in six states which ratified it, namely in the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. It may, of course, be that the rights
guaranteed in the Conventon are nevertheless adequately safeguarded in these
countries. But whether or not this be true, the fact remains that one cannot
test this proposition in their courts by attempting to show that a certain law or
governmental action violates the Convention. The same is also true in states
such as Austria and possibly Luxembourg, where the Convention has been
held not to be self-executing in nature. In all these countries, accordingly, an
individual does not enjoy the full benefits of the Convention because, if he
should in fact have a valid claim based on the Convention, the appropriate
domestic courts are powerless to give him any relief. This result cannot be
squared with the provisions of Article 13 of the Convention which stipulates
in part that "everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Con-
vention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national author-
ity .... ." It is difficult to see how an individual can have "an effective remedy
before a national authority," to enforce the rights guaranteed in the Convention,
if he cannot invoke a specific provision "set forth" therein.2 1 8 Article 13 must,
therefore, be interpreted to require each High Contracting Party to give the
Convention the status of domestic law.219 States which have as yet not done
so, have not fully implemented the Convention.
In such countries as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, on the other
hand, the Convention does have for all practical purposes the status of directly
applicable domestic law. Here an individual can effectively invoke a given
provision of the Convention in the national courts to enforce the rights
guaranteed by it. These states, furthermore, recognize the right of private
petition as well as the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court. These insti-
tutions, of course, lack the power to reverse a determination of a domestic tri-
bunal. But it is reasonable to assume that such national courts might in sub-
sequent litigation involving the same legal questions reconsider their own deter-
minations in the light of the opinions expressed by the Commission and espe-
cially the Human Rights Court.220 This type of informal interaction between
217. Marsh, supra note 204, at 537.
218. See Golsong, Das Rechtsschutzsystern der Europiischen Menschenrechtskonvention
8 (1958).
219. If it were interpreted not to impose such an obligation, it would be meaningless,
because it would add nothing that the Convention does not already provide for.
220. This, of course, is not possible in those countries, where the Convention lacks the
status of domestic law or where it has been considered to be non-self-executing, even though
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the international judiciary and national courts empowered to pass on the Con-
vention can work both ways in contributing to the growh of the Convention.
For example, it is readily conceivable that the Human Rights Court may be
les reluctant to adopt the more liberal interpretation of the Convention in a
given case, if it can point to relevant national decisions supporting such a
view.
These considerations point up one especially serious obstacle to the effect-
ive enforcement of the Convention. That is, that a state ratifying the Con-
vention does not thereby recognize or even undertake to recognize the right
of an individual to appeal to the Commission. Its negative consequences are
painfullly apparent if we recall that in Greece, for example, the Convention
has theoretically gained the status of domestic law without, as a practical
matter, offering any real protection because Greek courts have in the past
completely misunderstood its legal implications. But since Greece, like the
United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey, does not recognize the right of private
petitions, little can be done to rectify the situation. It is, of course, true that
another High Contracting Party might nevertheless submit the victim's claim
to the Commission. Experience shows, however, that states will rarely do this
so as not to jeopardize their relations with another friendly nation.22' In all
likelihood, one state will charge another with a breach of the Convention only
to further its own political interests.222 Thus, unless individuals have access
to the Commission and through it to the Human Rights Court, a state is
under no real compulsion to live up to the obligations it has assumed by
ratifying the Convention.
In practice, therefore, one cannot really divorce the domestic implementa-
tion of the Convention from the right of individual petition to the Commission.
The situation in Turkey under the Menderes regime demonstrates this proposi-
tion. A government willing to disregard basic human rights will not be deterred
by the fact that it is violating its own laws, even if their source be a duly
ratified treaty like the Convention. It is more likely to abstain from em-
barking upon such a course, however, if its actions are subject to review by
an international tribunal such as the Commission and the Court. Accordingly,
one cannot but conclude that, unless the Convention enjoys the status of the
domestic law in each state adhering to it and unless these states also recognize
the right of private petition to the Commission and the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Human Rights Court, the Convention will in some countries re-
main a document devoid of any meaning.
all of them, except for the United Kingdom, recognize the right of private petition. But
even in these countries it might have the effect of prompting legislative action designed to
conform domestic laws to the provisions of the Convention.
221. See Rolin, Les Conclusions du Colloque, 10 Annales 404, 411-12 (1961).
222. Thus, Greece accused the United Kingdom of such a violation in Cyprus before
that island became independent. And Austria has taken up various claims of certain South
Tyrolian irredentists alleging that their rights were violated by Italy.
